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Abstract
This is a companion to another paper. Together they rebut two widespread philo-
sophical doctrines about emergence. The first, and main, doctrine is that emergence
is incompatible with reduction. The second is that emergence is supervenience; or
more exactly, supervenience without reduction.
In the other paper, I develop these rebuttals in general terms, emphasising the
second rebuttal. Here I discuss the situation in physics, emphasising the first rebut-
tal. I focus on limiting relations between theories and illustrate my claims with four
examples, each of them a model or a framework for modelling, from well-established
mathematics or physics.
I take emergence as behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some com-
parison class. I take reduction as, essentially, deduction. The main idea of my first
rebuttal will be to perform the deduction after taking a limit of some parameter.
Thus my first main claim will be that in my four examples (and many others), we
can deduce a novel and robust behaviour, by taking the limitN →∞ of a parameter
N .
But on the other hand, this does not show that that the N =∞ limit is “physi-
cally real”, as some authors have alleged. For my second main claim is that in these
same examples, there is a weaker, yet still vivid, novel and robust behaviour that
occurs before we get to the limit, i.e. for finite N . And it is this weaker behaviour
which is physically real.
My examples are: the method of arbitrary functions (in probability theory);
fractals (in geometry); superselection for infinite systems (in quantum theory); and
phase transitions for infinite systems (in statistical mechanics).
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1 Introduction
1.1 A limited peace
‘More is different!’, proclaimed Philip Anderson in a famous paper (1972) advocating the
autonomy of what are often called ‘special’ or ‘higher-level’ sciences or theories. A catchy
slogan, indeed. But his reductionist opponents, such as Weinberg (1987), could have
matched it, by invoking Mies van der Rohe’s pithy defence of functionalist architecture:
‘Less is more’. Hence my title. For my main point will be that although emergence is
usually opposed to reduction, many examples exhibit both. So my title, ‘Less is different’,
is meant as an irenic combination of the two parties’ slogans. I will spell out this reconcil-
iation in two claims, illustrated by four examples. The two claims, mnemonically labelled
(1:Deduce) and (2:Before), are defined in Section 1.2; and each example is a model or a
framework for modelling, from well-established mathematics or physics.
My irenic title is also ironic. For it deliberately echoes the sceptical refrain that there
is nothing new under the Sun. Though I will not name names, most would agree that
there is a good deal of heat, and rather less light, in the debate about emergence vs.
reduction. Here’s hoping that you will not recite that same refrain after reading this
paper! Of course the heat and dark is in part due to different authors giving ‘emergence’
and ‘reduction’ different meanings. Thus I do not claim to be the only author to celebrate
these words’ compatibility. Among other celebrants, albeit using different meanings, are
Simon (1996, pp. 249-251) and Wimsatt (1997, pp. 99-100 and references therein).1
However, this is a companion to another paper (Butterfield 2010). So although the
papers can be read independently, I should begin by describing their common aims and
how they share out the work between them. In brief, both papers construe the contested
terms, ‘emergence’ and ‘reduction’, as follows; (the other paper gives more details, and a
defence of these construals; cf. its Sections 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1.1.).
I take emergence as behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some comparison
class. In particular, my examples will be typical of many, by using two widespread
conceptions of what the comparison class is, as follows. (1): Composites: The system is a
composite; and its properties and behaviour are novel and robust compared to those of its
component systems, especially its microscopic or even atomic components. (2): Limits:
The system is a limit of a sequence of systems, typically as some parameter (in the theory
of the systems) goes to infinity (or some other crucial value, often zero); and its properties
and behaviour are novel and robust compared to those of systems described with a finite
(respectively: non-zero) parameter. (Section 3 will explain how these ideas, (1) and (2),
are better put in terms of quantities and their values, rather than systems.)
I take reduction as, essentially, deduction; though usually aided by appropriate de-
finitions or bridge-principles linking the two theories’ vocabularies. This will be close
1Other playful variations on Anderson’s slogan occur in Kadanoff’s splendid historico-philosophical
introductions to phase transitions (2009, 2010, 2010a): which I will advert to in Section 7. Cat (1998)
is a scholarly review of the Anderson-Weinberg debate; Bouatta and Butterfield (2011) also contains a
discussion.
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to endorsing the traditional account of Nagel (1961), despite various objections levelled
against it. The picture is that the claims of some worse or less detailed (often earlier) the-
ory can be deduced within a better or more detailed (often later) theory, once we adjoin
to the latter appropriate definitions of the proprietary terms of the former. I also adopt
a mnemonic notation, writing Tb for the better, bottom or basic theory, and Tt for the
tainted, top or tangible theory; (where ‘tangible’ connotes restriction to the observable,
i.e. less detail). So the picture is, with D standing for the definitions: Tb&D ⇒ Tt. In
logicians’ jargon: Tt is a definitional extension of Tb.
In both papers, especially the other one, I consider a notion much discussed in the
philosophy (but not physics) literature: supervenience (also known as ‘determination’ or
‘implicit definability’). This is a less contested term. It is taken by all to be a relation
between families of properties: the extensions of all the properties in one family relative
to a given domain of objects determine the extension of each property in the other family.
Besides, under wide conditions, this is a weakening of the usual notion of the second family
being definable from the first, which is called ‘explicit definability’. Roughly speaking,
this weakening allows a definition of a property P in the second family, in terms of the
first family, to be infinitely long, rather than finite.
Since the definitions used in a Nagelian reduction are finite, supervenience is widely
taken to be a weakening of Nagelian reduction. Besides, various philosophers have con-
sidered the infinity of “ways to be P” given by an infinitely long definition to be a good
way of making precise the heterogeneity or multiplicity of realization that philosophers
have often associated with emergence. Thus arose the doctrine that emergence is “mere
supervenience”, i.e. supervenience without all the definitions being finite, as in a Nagelian
reduction.
With these construals of the terms, the papers aim to rebut two widespread doctrines
about emergence: the doctrine just mentioned, that emergence is mere supervenience,
found in the philosophy literature; and the more widespread doctrine, found also in the
physics literature (including the Anderson-Weinberg debate), that emergence is incom-
patible with reduction.
In the other paper, I develop these rebuttals in general terms; including a discussion
of some other possible construals of the contested terms. I also emphasise supervenience,
and thereby the first rebuttal. Thus I give (i) examples of mere supervenience which
are not emergence and (ii) examples of emergence which are not mere supervenience nor
reduction.
But in this paper, I will discuss the situation in physics and down-play supervenience,
thus emphasising the second rebuttal. That is, I will argue that emergence is compatible
with reduction, since physics gives examples combining both. The main idea will be to
perform the reduction, i.e. deduction, after taking a limit of some parameter. Thus my
first main claim, (1:Deduce), will be that in my four examples (and many others), we can
deduce a novel and robust behaviour, by taking the limit N →∞ of a parameter N .
But on the other hand, this does not show that that the N = ∞ limit is “physically
real”, as some authors have alleged. For my second main claim, (2:Before), is that in
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these same examples, there is a weaker, yet still vivid, novel and robust behaviour that
occurs before we get to the limit, i.e. for finite N . And it is this weaker behaviour which
is physically real.
This contrast between strong and weak senses of emergence, and respectively its ab-
sence or presence at finite N , will be the main common theme across my four examples. It
will also illuminate another current topic within philosophy of physics, about the signifi-
cance of ‘singular’ limits in a physical theory. In fact, some authors propose to characterize
emergence in terms of ‘singular’ limits.2 I deny this proposal. Although my two claims,
and my four examples combining emergence and reduction, involve taking a limit, the
limit is singular in only two of the four examples (the second and fourth, viz. fractals and
phase transitions). So emergence is not always a matter of a singular limit—just as it is
not always a matter of mere supervenience.
This negative verdict leaves open many questions, in particular: is emergence always a
matter of a limit, whether singular or not? And even though a singular limit is not neces-
sary for emergence, is it sufficient? In fact I think the answers to these questions are again
‘No’. But I will not attempt to give a detailed characterization of emergence, whereby to
prove these last two ‘No’s.3 The literature contains several such characterizations, with
various merits. But as I explain in the other paper (especially Sections 1.1, 2.1), I doubt
that there is—and that there needs to be—a single best meaning of ‘emergence’; and sim-
ilarly for ‘reduction’. Anyway, I can develop my claims and examples while adopting my
construals—of ‘emergence’ as novel and robust behaviour, and of reduction as deduction
a la Nagel.
Before I give a prospectus (Section 1.2), I should make two final comments about
these construals, and about my choice of examples. First: I submit that my construals of
‘emergence’ and ‘reduction’ are strong enough to make it worth exhibiting examples that
combine them. Also, they seem to be in tension with each other: since logic teaches us
that valid deduction gives no new “content”, how can one ever deduce novel behaviour?
This tension is also shown by the fact that many authors who take emergence to involve
novel behaviour thereby take it to also involve irreducibility. The answer to the ‘how?’
question, i.e. my reconciliation, will lie in using limits: one performs the deduction after
taking a limit of some parameter. So one main moral will be that in such a limit there
can be novelty, compared with what obtains away from the limit.
Second: there is the issue of how I choose my examples. Here you may suspect
what might be called the ‘case-study gambit’: trying to support a general conclusion by
describing examples that have the required features, though in fact the examples are not
2I have used scare-quotes since writers often use the term loosely—too loosely, as I explain, and
complain, in Section 3. But for easier reading, I will henceforth drop the scare-quotes.
3Incidentally, for the last ‘No’, that a singular limit is not sufficient for emergence: I agree with
Wayne’s argument for this (against Rueger (2000, p. 308; 2006, pp. 344-345)). Wayne uses Rueger’s
own example, of the van der Pol oscillator (Wayne 2009, Sections 3-5). My second example, fractals,
will give another counterexample (Section 5.2.1): the topological dimension of a sequence of sets CN
is discontinuous in the limit, i.e. limN→0 dim CN 6= dim limN→0CN , but there is no emergence. For
persuasive, more general, critiques of associating emergence or irreducibility with “singular asymptotics”,
cf. Belot (2005, especially Section 5) and Hooker (2004, pp. 446-458).
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typical, so that the attempt fails, i.e. the general conclusion, that all or most examples
have the features, does not follow. But to this charge also I plead innocent, for the simple
reason that I will not urge so general a conclusion, in the way that a reductionist opponent
of Anderson might. (For example, I think Weinberg’s objective reductionism (1987, p.
349-353) implies that (with my meanings of the terms) all known examples of emergence
are also examples of reduction.) On the other hand, I do aspire to some generality! It
will be clear that my claims, in particular my two main ones, (1:Deduce) and (2:Before),
are illustrated by many examples beyond the four I have chosen. So I submit that the
claims reflect the amazing power of Nagelian reduction.
1.2 Prospectus
Thus my main aim is to reconcile emergence with reduction, by arguing for two main
claims, illustrated by four examples. Each example is a model, or a framework for mod-
elling, from well-established mathematics or physics; and each involves an integer para-
meter N = 1, 2, ... and its limit N →∞. In three of the examples, N is, roughly speaking,
the number of physical degrees of freedom of the system; in the second example, it is the
number of iterations of a definitional process.
In all the examples, N is, physically speaking, finite. But we can consider the limit:
both what happens on the way to the limit, and what happens at it. (In Section 3, I
will be more precise about the meaning of ‘what happens’, in terms of quantities being
well-defined and what their values are.) Doing so yields my two main claims. The first is:
(1:Deduce): Emergence is compatible with reduction. And this is so, with a
strong understanding both of ‘emergence’ (i.e. ‘novel and robust behaviour’)
and of ‘reduction’ (viz. logicians’ notion of definitional extension). In short:
in the examples, considering N → ∞ enables us to deduce novel and robust
behaviour, in strong senses of ‘novel’ and ‘robust’.
Besides, one needs to consider the limit in that: for each example, choosing a
weaker theory using finite N blocks the deduction of this strong sense. And (as
discussed in Section 3), this weaker theory is appropriate and salient, i.e. liable
to come to mind. Since the theories Tt and Tb are often defined only vaguely
(by labels like ‘thermodynamics’ and ‘statistical mechanics’), this swings-and-
roundabouts situation explains away some of the controversy over whether Tt
is reducible to Tb.
The second claim is:
(2:Before): But on the other hand: emergence, in a weaker yet still vivid
sense, occurs before we get to the limit. That is: in each example, one can
understand ‘novel and robust behaviour’ weakly enough that it does occur for
finite N .
Of my four examples, I have chosen the first three to be comparatively small, simple
and agreed-upon, so that the philosophical issues stand out more clearly. They are from
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probability theory, geometry and quantum theory, respectively. The fourth example is an
enormous topic in physics, with much less agreement. The examples are, in order:
1: The method of arbitrary functions, in probability theory; (Section 4);
2: Fractals, in geometry; (Section 5);
3: Superselection for infinite systems, in quantum theory; (Section 6);
4: Phase transitions for infinite systems, in classical statistical mechanics (Section 7).
Apart from the contrast between strong and weak senses of emergence shown by
(1:Deduce) and (2:Before), there will be two other philosophical themes in common across
the four examples.
The first is that supervenience is a “red herring”, i.e. irrelevant. (So this supports the
other paper’s rebuttal of the doctrine that emergence is mere supervenience.) For clarity,
it will again be best to give this a mnemonic label, as follows:
(3:Herring): Although various supervenience theses are true in the examples
(and many others), the theses yield little or no insight—either into emergence,
or more generally, into “what is going on” in the example.
We can already state the basic reason for this irrelevance. Supervenience allows that for
each property P in the “higher” i.e. supervening family of properties, there is, in the
taxonomy given by the lower family, a disjunction of “ways to be P”. But supervenience
gives no “control” on this disjunction: not just in the sense that the disjunction might be
infinite, but also that supervenience allows it to be utterly heterogeneous. In particular,
no kind of limit is taken; and more generally, no connection is made between the variety,
or infinity, of the disjunction and the limit processes, especially N →∞, which are crucial
to the example. Thus supervenience is, at least in these examples (and, I submit, many
others), too weak a concept to be enlightening.
The other theme in common across the four examples is that each example becomes,
for finite but very large N , unrealistic in a vivid—one might even say: catastrophic—way.
But this occurs for reasons external to current debates about emergence, reduction and
the significance of limits of physical theories. It also will not undermine my (2:Before).
This is because each of my examples illustrates (2:Before) for values of its parameter N
much smaller than those at which the example becomes unrealistic in the catastrophic
way. So I will not emphasize this theme. On the other hand, the theme seems to have
been completely neglected in these debates’ literature; so it is worth spelling out. I will
do this in Section 2, again giving it a mnemonic label, (4:Unreal).
After I discuss (4:Unreal), I give in Section 3 a general discussion of physical systems
and their states and quantities, emphasizing the topic of limits: i.e. limits of systems,
states and quantities, as some parameter N (typically the number of degrees of freedom)
goes to infinity. There are two related philosophical questions to be addressed. The first,
mentioned in Section 1.1, is whether emergence can be characterized in terms of limits,
especially singular limits. Contra some authors, I deny this; (along with others such as
Wayne, Belot and Hooker).
The second question is whether in some examples, the singular limit is—not just
indispensable for deducing emergence in some strong sense, or for epistemic concerns such
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as explanation and understanding—but also ‘physically real’. These two questions are
related in various ways: most obviously, by a Yes to the second implying that emergence
according to the first would be physically real.
I shall also deny this: again, contra some authors. In more detail: my first claim,
(1:Deduce), will illustrate how limits can be indispensable—viz. to deducing some novel
and robust behaviour, where the behaviour in question is taken in a strong sense. And
on the other hand, my second claim, (2:Before), will bring out how the N = ∞ limit is
not physically real. That is: only the weaker sense of emergence that occurs at finite N
is physically real.
So let me sum up my claims. Emergence is not in all cases failure of reduction, even in
the strong sense of reduction given by deduction (cf. (1:Deduce)). (Here, the deduction’s
need to invoke auxiliary definitions of the reduced theory’s terms is made precise by
logicians’ notion of definitional extension; for details, cf. Section 3.1 of the companion
paper). Nor does emergence in all cases occur only in the limit of the relevant parameter
(cf. (2:Before)). Nor is emergence in all cases a matter of this limit being “singular” in
some sense: my first and third examples will have non-singular limits (cf. also Section 3).
Nor is emergence in all cases supervenience; nor is it in all cases failure of supervenience;
(cf. Section 5 of the companion paper, and for the latter denial, (1:Deduce)). In short:
we have before us a varied landscape—emergence is independent of these other notions.
2 Becoming unrealistic on the way to the limit
As we will see, my examples (and many other models, such as continuous models of fluids
and solids) are examples of: formulating a formalism by taking an admittedly unrealistic
limit of a parameter’s value. But they are also examples of: formulating a formalism by
taking a limit of a description which is admitted to be unrealistic on the way to the limit.
This is my fourth labelled claim:
(4:Unreal): Each of the four examples becomes unrealistic before one gets to
the N = ∞ limit—regardless of any technical issues about that limit, and
regardless of any philosophical controversies about emergence.
One reason I need to discuss this claim is to show how it is consistent with (2:Before):
the main point will be (as I mentioned) that (2:Before) applies to much smaller values
of N . But phase transitions will also yield a remarkable illustration of “oscillations”
between (2:Before) and (4:Unreal). In Section 7.2.2, we will see how a system can be
manipulated so as to first illustrate (2:Before), i.e. an emergent behaviour at finite N ,
then lose this behaviour, i.e. illustrate (4:Unreal), and then enter a regime illustrating
some other emergent behaviour (or revert to the first behaviour): a phenomenon called
‘cross-over’.
There are also two other reasons why it is worth stating this claim, i.e. reasons
unrelated to my own position in debates about emergence. First, almost all discussions
of emergence, or more generally of limiting relations between theories, in the physics and
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philosophy literatures, fail to notice this point. Agreed, some maestros notice it—though
I do not mean to argue from authority! Thus Feynman: ‘When you follow any of our
physics too far, you find that you always get into some kind of trouble’ (1964, Lecture
28.1).4
Second, there is a common kind of reason for the un-realisticness (“break-down”) of
the examples. Besides, this kind of reason inevitably besets many other examples of
taking limits of models as a parameter N , encoding physical degrees of freedom or some
analogous concept, goes to ∞. So this commonality is worth registering, especially in
discussions of emergence, or more generally of limits of models as a parameter N →∞.
In short, the commonality is: as N becomes very large, the example runs up against
either the micro-structure of space and its contents (for short: atomism), or the macro-
structure of space and its contents (for short: cosmology). Thus my first two examples will
run up against atomism: that is, very large N will correspond to atomic or sub-atomic
lengths, making what the example says utterly unrealistic. And my third and fourth
examples will run up against cosmology: very large N will correspond to cosmic lengths
(and so gravity, and indeed spacetime curvature), again making what the example says
utterly unrealistic. I stress that these break-downs are not internal to the model, but
in relation to the actual world. To take my third and fourth examples: if there were no
gravity nor spacetime curvature, and if space had the structure of IR3, these examples,
which postulate a chain of N spins or a gas of N molecules, in IR3 without gravity, would
indeed remain realistic as N grows without bound.
I say ‘in short’, because in some examples Feynman’s ‘some kind of trouble’ is not
just either atomism or cosmology. The situation can be more varied. I will not enter
into details, let alone try to classify the kinds of trouble. But to illustrate: my first
example, the method of arbitrary functions, will include a model of a roulette wheel
whose angular velocity tends to infinity; so the trouble will be, not atomism, but the
fact that the model is Newtonian not relativistic! And more importantly: in my fourth
example, phase transitions, some models run up against both atomism and cosmology.
For in some models, the thermodynamic limit is not just the idea that keeping the density
constant, the number N of molecules (and so the volume) tends to infinity: there are also
conditions on the limiting behaviour of short-range forces.
However, (4:Unreal) plays a different role in my discussion from my other three labelled
claims: so I will not emphasize it as much as the others. There are two differences. First:
4I should mention another meaning of ‘intermediate between small and infinite values of a parameter’
that is noticed by the physics literature, under the label ‘intermediate asymptotics’: namely, a system’s
behaviour ‘for times, and distances from boundaries, large enough for the influence of the fine details of
the initial and/or boundary conditions to disappear, but small enough that the system is far from the
ultimate equilibrium state’ (Barenblatt 1996, p. xiii; cf. also p. 19). This meaning is obviously very
different from this Section’s ‘intermediate N ’ regime. But it is worth mentioning, not just because of
its intrinsic importance, but also because: (i) it is related to renormalization, which I will touch on in
Section 7.2.2 (cf. also Goldenfeld et al. (1989)); and (ii) some philosophers (to their credit) have discussed
it—though surely Batterman goes much too far when he writes ‘I think, as should be obvious by now,
that any investigation that remotely addresses a question related to understanding universal behavior
[i.e. in philosophers’ terms: multiple realizability] will involve intermediate asymptotics as understood
by Barenblatt’ (2002, p. 46).
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with one exception, discussions of these examples and many others—including discussions
about emergence, and the examples’ N =∞ limit—do not, so far as I know, mention this
un-realisticness for very large N . (The exception is my second example, viz. fractals.)
Second: in each of my four examples, this un-realisticness for very large N is not relevant
to the ways that:
(1): a strong sense of emergent (i.e. novel and robust) behaviour can be deduced
at the limit (cf. (1:Deduce)); and
(2): a weaker, yet still vivid, sense of emergent behaviour occurs on the way to the
limit (cf. (2:Before)); and
(3): supervenience is a red herring, giving little or no insight into the example (cf.
(3:Herring)).
So my discussion of emergence, in particular my main positive aim—the reconciliation
got by combining my first two claims (1:Deduce) and (2:Before)—can proceed without
discussing (4:Unreal). I stress again that each of the four examples illustrates (2:Before)
for values of its parameter N much smaller than those at which the example becomes
unrealistic. (And this point applies in many other examples of taking limits of models as
a degrees-of-freedom parameter goes to ∞.) So to keep the discussion of my examples
as simple as possible, I will not explicitly refer there to (4:Unreal)—except at (i) the end
of the second example, fractals, for which, as I said, the literature has noticed the point;
and at (ii) the end of the fourth example, where the phenomenon of cross-over subtly
combines (4:Unreal) with (2:Before).
3 Systems, states, quantities, values—and their lim-
its
In Section 1.2, I promised that my two claims, (1:Deduce) and (2:Before), would clarify—I
dare not say resolve!—the question whether in some examples of ‘infinite’ and-or ‘singular’
limits, the limit is not just epistemically indispensable but also ‘physically real’. More
specifically, I said I would agree about the indispensability, thanks to (1:Deduce), but deny
the reality, thanks to (2:Before). But even before I show those claims in my examples, I
can defend my general position; and in particular, justify my denying the physical reality
of the limits. That is the job of this Section.
This is a job worth doing for two reasons. First, some discussions of emergence, and
more generally, of limiting relations between theories are sloppy in their use of mathemat-
ical jargon about limits being ‘singular’ vs. ‘regular/well-behaved/continuous’ etc. And
as I mentioned in Section 1.1, some authors even identify emergence with what happens at
a ‘singular’ limit (Batterman (2002, pp. 6, 120, 127, 135), (2006, pp. 902-903), (2009, pp.
23-24); Rueger (2000, p. 308), (2006, pp. 344-345)). At least for my sense of emergence
as novel and robust behaviour, this is wrong. In two of my four examples, there is nothing
‘singular’ about the limit. And recall that footnote 3 cited other arguments (and other
authors) to the effect that a singular limit is not sufficient for emergence or irreducibility.
Second, some of the literature’s physical examples and philosophical discussions are
11
dauntingly complex. To take just one current philosopher: Batterman’s examples include:
(a) ray optics as a limit of wave optics; (b): classical mechanics as a limit of quantum
mechanics; (c): hydrodynamics as a limit of molecular models; (d): phase transitions as
described in the thermodynamic limit of statistical mechanics. Each of these is a large
and complex area of physics, in which recent decades have seen a lot of deep and beautiful
work—some of whose creators have themselves given masterly philosophical discussions
(e.g. Berry 1994, Goldenfeld et al. 1989, Kadanoff 2009, 2010, 2010a). So there is a great
deal for philosophers to address; (and all credit to Batterman and others for doing so).
But we run the risk of being blinded by science, i.e. being misled by arcane technicalia.
So I propose to discuss just one area, and even that only briefly: phase transitions, which
will be my fourth example. (As I mentioned in Section 1.2, I chose my first three examples
partly for their merit of being comparatively small and simple, so that the philosophical
issues are clearer.) There is also a mountain of previous philosophical discussion, far too
large to be addressed here. For apart from current authors like Batterman and Rueger,
limiting relations between physical theories (singular or not) have long been a topic for
authors such as Post, Schaffner, Scheibe, Rohrlich and Redhead. So I propose here just
to spell out the general situation, as I see it. That will be enough to indicate how (at
least in my examples!) there is no reason to believe the limit is physically real—a verdict
which my examples will then confirm.
I divide the task in three subsections, 3.1 to 3.3. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 lay out some
distinctions. Then Section 3.3 addresses the philosophical issue of what justifies our using
a description withN =∞. There I argue that even when the relevant limits are singular, a
straightforward and broadly instrumentalist justification, viz. mathematical convenience
and empirical correctness, applies: so that we need not believe the limit is physically real.
3.1 Emergence with and without infinite systems—and with or-
dinary limits
We begin by envisaging physical systems, σ say, each labelled by its parameter N , and
thus a sequence of ever larger systems σ(N). In all that follows (including my examples)
N ∈ N := the set of natural numbers. But nothing in this Section or the sequel depends
on this: we could have N ∈ IR. We need to distinguish three questions, about systems,
quantities and values respectively.
(1): One can ask whether this sequence has as a limit, in the sense of there being (as
a mathematical entity) a natural well-defined infinite system σ(∞).
(2): One can ask whether a sequence of quantities on successive systems, say f(N) :=
f(σ(N)), has a limit, which we might denote by f(∞). (Of course, the physical idea of
each member of such a sequence will be in common, e.g. energy or momentum: but we
distinguish the members by their being quantities on different (sizes of) system.)
(3): Finally, one can ask whether a sequence of real number values of quantities on
successive systems, say v(f(N)) := v(f(σ(N))), has a limit.
Of course, question (3) is the most familiar. The notion of limit is the elementary
notion from calculus, limN→∞ v(f(N)). Here a sequence of states, sN say, on the σ(N) is
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to be implicitly understood, so as to define values for the quantities f(N); but to simplify
notation, I will for the most part not mention sN , and indeed take states as understood.
Recall also from the calculus that if a real sequence vN ∈ IR grows without bound, i.e.
for any number M the vN eventually remain greater than M , we write: limN→∞ vN =∞.
This is of course different from the idea (in Section 3.2 below) of taking ∞ as a possible
value of the parameter or label on v, i.e. the idea of a sequence element v∞ ∈ IR, which
is after the denumerable sequence vN , N ∈ N.5
But we can also make sense of the first two questions. As to (1): in both classical
and quantum physics we can often define the limit of a sequence σ(N). Some approaches
individuate a system by its state-space, and then use infinite cartesian or tensor products
(for the classical and quantum cases respectively). Other approaches individuate a system
by its set (in fact: algebra) of quantities, and then define limit algebras. This leads to
how we make sense of (2). The algebra of quantities usually has a mathematical structure
(in particular a topology) that enables one to define the limit of a sequence of quantities
(i.e. not just, as in (1), a limit of a sequence of their values).
Note that the existence of an infinite system σ(∞) should not in general be identified
with the existence of a limit quantity f(∞), or even several such; nor with the sequence
of values v(f(N)) having a limit in the ordinary calculus sense. Indeed, my first example
(the method of arbitrary functions) will illustrate this. There will be no infinite system
σ(∞), but the sequences of values v(f(N)) will each have a limit in the ordinary sense—in
fact a finite one, viz. 1
2
. These limits are in no way ‘singular’. Yet there will be emergence,
i.e. novel and robust behaviour.
There are also cases where there is (as a mathematical entity) an infinite system, and
quantities defined on it whose values are the ordinary (in no way ‘singular’) limits of values
on the finite systems; and where there is emergence. My third example (superselection in
quantum theory) will illustrate this.
And finally there are cases that suit the enthusiastic talk about singular limits! That
is: cases where there is (as a mathematical entity) an infinite system, and quantities
defined on it that take “new” values, i.e. values different from the limits of values on
the finite systems. My second and fourth examples (fractals and phase transitions) will
illustrate this, the emergence being shown by these new values.6 Section 3.2 gives a few
more details.
3.2 The limit of a sequence vs. what is true at that limit
The mathematical idea of this distinction is elementary. Recall that if we adjoin the
number ∞ to the natural numbers N, then we can consider sequences of real numbers
vn ∈ IR, with n ∈ N∪{∞}, i.e. sequences of order-type ω+1. For such sequences we can
define the ordinary notion of limit, i.e. limn∈N vn; and then of course we recognize that
5My examples will of course need rather more calculus: e.g. we will need to distinguish between
different kinds of convergence.
6But as argued in footnote 3, such discontinuous limits are not sufficient for emergence.
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there are cases in which lim vn := limn∈N vn exists and is not equal to v∞. For v∞ means
the (ω + 1)-th member of the sequence—a quite different idea from the ordinary limit!
Section 3.1’s idea of an infinite system σ(∞) allows us to apply this mathematical
idea. We simply interpret adjoining the number ∞ to the set of finite values of N as
considering the infinite system σ(∞), as well as the finite systems σ(N). I shall spell this
out: first (a) for values of quantities, and then (b) for quantities themselves.
(a): Values of quantities: Suppose: (i) a sequence v(f(N)) of values of a quantity has a
limit limN→∞ v(f(N)) as N tends to infinity (as mentioned in Section 3.1, a sequence of
states sN is here understood, so that one might write v(f(N), sN)). And suppose also:
(ii) there is also a well-defined infinite system σ(∞) on which:
the common physical idea of the various f(N) makes sense and gives a natural
well-defined limit quantity, which we might write as f(σ(∞)) (on σ(∞)); and on which
there is a natural well-defined limit state, s say.
Then we need to distinguish:
(i) the given limit of the values, limN→∞ v(f(N)) ≡ limN→∞ v(f(N, sN)), from
(ii) the value v(f(σ(∞), s) of the natural limit quantity f(σ(∞)) in the natural limit
state, s.
(b): Quantities: For quantities themselves, rather than values, the point is in essence the
same. The statement is a close parallel of that in (a): indeed, shorter since we refer only
to quantities, not to values of quantities—albeit thereby more abstract. Thus suppose: (i)
a sequence of quantities f(N) has a limit, dubbed f(∞) in Section 3.1. And suppose also:
(ii) there is also a well-defined infinite system σ(∞) on which the common physical idea
of the various f(N) makes sense and gives a natural well-defined limit quantity, which we
might write as f(σ(∞)) (on σ(∞)).
Then we need to distinguish:
(i) the given limit, f(∞) := limN→∞f(N), from
(ii) the natural definition of the quantity f(σ(∞)) on σ(∞).
3.3 Justifying N =∞
3.3.1 Distinguishing straightforward from mysterious cases
‘Justifying N = ∞’ is of course a shorthand! For—to sum up Sections 3.1 and 3.2—we
have just learnt to distinguish two numbers: although in some models they are both well-
defined and equal, they need not be! Namely:
(i): the limit limN→∞ v(f(N)) of a sequence of values (which limit might equal ±∞);
(ii): the value v(f(σ(∞)) of the natural limit quantity f(σ(∞)) on the infinite system
σ(∞).
So if we ask the question what justifies an “N =∞” model or description of a system, for
which N is actually finite, we must allow that the answers may be different for different
models. (Here and in the rest of this Subsection, I consider, for simplicity, just values of
quantities as in (a) of Section 3.2: not quantities themselves, as in (b) of Section 3.2.)
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We of course expect a straightforward justification for the two cases of ‘non-singular’
limits, i.e. the cases:
(a): (i) is well-defined (though perhaps = ±∞), but there is no infinite system so that
(ii) is ill-defined; (cf. my first example, the method of arbitrary functions);
(b): there is an infinite system, and (i) and (ii) are both well-defined and are equal;
(cf. my third example, superselection in quantum theory).
Namely, we expect a justification in terms of convenience and correctness, along the
lines:
(Straightforward Justification): The use of the infinite limit—i.e. the use of
(i) for case (a), and the use of (i) = (ii) for case (b)—is justified, despite N
being actually finite, by its being mathematically convenient and empirically
correct (up to the required accuracy).
I shall develop and endorse this Justification in Section 3.3.3.
On the other hand, for ‘singular limits’, i.e. cases where (i) and (ii) are both well-
defined but are not equal, and (ii) rather than (i) is empirically correct, matters are surely
not straightforward. Such cases seem mysterious. Faced with such a case, should we give
up the assumption that N is actually finite? But in some examples, e.g. where N is the
number of molecules in a sample of gas (as in my fourth example, phase transitions), this
apparently amounts to giving up the atomic constitution of matter!7
Nevertheless, some advocates of the philosophical importance of singular limits give
up, or at least come very close to giving up, N ’s finiteness. I take as examples, three
quotes from Batterman (his italics):
‘a physically singular problem ... the “blow-ups” or divergences ... are the
result of the singular nature of the physics’ (2002, p. 56); ‘real systems exhibit
physical discontinuities ... genuine physical discontinuities—real singularities
in the physical system’ (2005, pp. 235-236); ‘no de-idealizing story is possible
even in principle’ (2010, p. 17).
Agreed, in other passages, he holds back (thank goodness!):
‘in (2005), I do speak rather sloppily of genuine physical singularities. It is
best to think instead in terms of some kind of genuine qualitative change in
the system at a given scale’ (2010, p. 22); ‘fluids are composed of a finite
number of molecules’ (2006, p. 903); ‘water in real tea kettles consists of a
finite number of molecules’ (2010, p. 7; this quotation also occurs, together
with its surrounding passage, at 2009, p. 9).
Note that this mysteriousness does not depend on (i) being well defined. If the v(f(N))
have no limit, not even ±∞, nevertheless the actual value is presumably v(f(N0)) for
some actual but unknown N0. So (ii) being empirically correct means that v(f(N0)) ≈
v(f(σ(∞))) up to the required accuracy. But how can that be?
7Thanks to John Norton for stressing this point—as a reductio, of course.
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3.3.2 Dissolving the mystery
I think the mystery can be dissolved, in two stages. (1): First, I will concede that to
deny that N is finite might be a reasonable move. But in all the examples I know, in
particular in all of my examples, this move is wrong. (Here, the important point is that
in my second and fourth examples, fractals and phase transitions, this move is wrong: for
as noted in Section 3.3.1, my first and third examples of emergence have no mysterious
‘singular limit’.) So the more important stage will be the second one, (2) below: viz.,
that we need to consider quantities other than f . I turn to details.
(1): Denying that N is finite; other degrees of freedom:— I admit it can be reasonable
to deny that N is finite. But this means something less radical than denying atomism!
Rather we conclude that the finite-N model has not picked the right, or not all the right,
degrees of freedom for understanding the system; and that the (model of the) infinite
system has somehow ‘clued in to’ the missing relevant degrees of freedom, as shown by
its empirical correctness.
My fourth example, phase transitions in statistical mechanics, provides a putative
example. Assuming that the correct description of a boiling kettle requires infinitely many
degrees of freedom, it is reasonable to say that, since the kettle contains finitely many
atoms, and so finitely many mechanical degrees of freedom, other degrees of freedom—
e.g. of the electromagnetic field—must somehow be involved. Reasonable: but very
programmatic! In fact, there is good evidence that the electromagnetic field is not involved
in phase transitions—suggesting that the answer to the mystery lies elsewhere ...
(2): Other quantities:— The mystery is an artefact of focussing on just one quantity
(f in my notation). Once we consider appropriate other quantities (and maybe related
mathematical notions), the mystery dissolves. Thus in my second and fourth examples
(fractals and phase transitions), there are other quantities, for which (despite f ’s singular
limit) the finite-N model, for large N , is close to the values given by the infinite model:
and is thereby also empirically correct. In fact, these other quantities are ‘cousins’ of the
quantity f which we first considered. Thus the mystery will be dissolved by my second
claim, (2:Before): namely, we see a weak yet vivid version of the emergent behaviour before
we get to the limit. Besides, I would claim—though I cannot defend it in this paper—
that this is so in all of physics’ similar cases (in particular, in Batterman’s examples from
optics, semiclassical mechanics and hydrodynamics).
Agreed, for me to say ‘there are other quantities or notions for which the finite-N model
is close to the infinite model’ or ‘we see a weak version of emergence before the limit’, is
unsatisfyingly abstract. Indeed, it is dismayingly close to the mysterious explanandum,
viz. that the infinite model is empirically correct! But I submit that at this very general
level, these formulations are the best one can do. To see vividly how the mystery dissolves,
one has to look at examples; cf. my second and fourth examples. But here is a simple
mathematical example illustrating the issues—and that there really is no mystery! As we
shall see, it is not just a mathematical toy: it models physical situations, especially phase
transitions.
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Consider the sequence of real functions gN : IR→ IR, N ∈ N, defined by
gN(x) := −1 iff x ≤ −1
N
; (3.1)
gN(x) := Nx iff
−1
N
≤ x ≤ 1
N
; (3.2)
gN(x) := +1 iff
1
N
≤ x . (3.3)
Thus gN(x) is constant and equal to −1 (respectively +1) for x less than −1N (respectively:
greater than 1
N
); and it increases linearly, with gradient N , over the interval [−1
N
, 1
N
], so
that for all N , gN(0) = 0. Each gN is continuous; but the sequence has as its limit the
function g∞ given by
g∞(x) = −1 iff x < 0 ; g∞(0) = 0 ; g∞(x) = 1 iff 0 < x ; (3.4)
which is discontinuous at 0.8 So this limit is ‘singular’ in the sense that continuity is lost.
We can make this more formal by introducing a two-valued quantity fN , N ∈ N∪{∞}
that encodes whether or not gN is continuous: fN := 0 if gN is continuous and fN := 1 if
gN is discontinuous. Then we have: fN = 0 for all finite N ∈ N, but f∞ = 1. So in our
(i)/(ii) notation (from Sections 3.2 and 3.3.1), we have a case where (i) and (ii) are both
well-defined but are unequal.
But there is no mystery here! There only seems to be a mystery if we look solely at
the two-valued quantity fN , whose values report that the limit is ‘singular’, but which
say nothing about how “close”, for large N , the gN are to g∞.
Besides, there remains no mystery if we add some physical interpretation to the dis-
cussion. Thus imagine that the values of gN in a neighbourhood of 0, or the slope of gN
thereabouts, are part of a model of a system with N degrees of freedom. N varies, and is
in general large; so that one considers the sequence of functions gN . Now imagine that for
large N , it is hard to know the actual value N0 of N and-or hard to calculate the value
of gN , even if you know x. (Agreed: my example is so simple that only a dimwit could
find the calculation hard! Such is the price of a simple example ...) In this situation, it
obviously could be both (a) mathematically convenient and (b) empirically accurate—i.e.
close enough to the predictions made by gN0(x) for the actual x—to work with g∞.
For as to (a): g∞’s being discontinuous need not make it inconvenient. Better the
discontinuous g∞ that you can get a grip on, than the hard-to-know and-or hard-to-
calculate gN0 ! And as to (b): as N grows, the range of x for which gN(x) 6= g∞(x)
becomes arbitrarily small. Besides, for x = 0—which might be a physically significant
argument—g∞ is completely accurate: i.e. for all N , gN(0) = g∞(0). In short: again, no
mystery. There only seems to be a mystery if we look solely at fN , and ignore the details
about gN and g∞.
Finally, I stress that this mathematical example has two other features that make it a
good prototype for my “singular limit” examples—i.e. my second and fourth, fractals and
8The convergence is pointwise not uniform: uniform limits of continuous functions are continuous.
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phase transitions; (hence my choice of it!). First: each example will have a two-valued
quantity fN , N ∈ N∪{∞}, with fN = 0 for all N ∈ N and f∞ = 1. In fact, this quantity
simply records the presence or absence of the emergent novel property; with presence
encoded by f = 1. So the jump in the value of f corresponds to my claim (1:Deduce).
Second: in phase transitions (my fourth example, Section 7) there are physical quan-
tities for finite models whose gradients grow without bound as N → ∞, just like this
example’s gradients of gN in a neighbourhood of 0. So the remarks here, about the un-
mysterious mathematical convenience and empirical accuracy of g∞, will apply—word for
word!
Let me look ahead a little to Section 7, especially Section 7.1.2.B (if only to placate
afficionados!). Consider the phase transition of a ferromagnet at sub-critical tempera-
tures, as described by the Ising model with N sites (in two or more spatial dimensions).
The magnetization behaves, as a function of the applied magnetic field, very like this
example’s gN . Thus suppose our variable x represents the value of the applied field (in a
given spatial direction). Then to a good approximation, gN represents the average mag-
netization (in appropriate units). So as the applied field passes from negative to positive
values, the ferromagnet’s magnetization flips from -1 (i.e. alignment with the field in the
negative direction) to +1 (alignment in the positive direction). But for larger N , the
ferromagnet “lingers longer”: the larger number of sites gives it more “inertia” before
the rising value of x succeeds in flipping the magnetization from -1 to +1. (Here, my
qualifying phrase ‘to a good approximation’ refers to the Ising model’s magnetization
being a smooth function of the applied field (in fact given, in mean field theory, by the
hyperbolic tangent function tanh), and so without sharp corners at ±1/N like my gN .)
Thus the magnetic susceptibility, defined as the derivative of magnetization with respect
to magnetic field, is, in the neighbourhood of 0, larger for larger N , and tends to infinity
as N → ∞: compare the gradients of gN in my example. Very similar remarks apply
to liquid-gas phase transition, i.e. boiling. Here the quantity which becomes infinite in
the N →∞ limit, i.e. the analogue of the magnetic susceptibility, is the compressibility,
defined as the derivative of the density with respect to the pressure.9
To sum up: I have dissolved the mystery about cases in which (i), i.e. the limit of the
finite model, is not equal to (ii), the infinite model, and in which (ii) is empirically correct,
by arguing that there are other quantities (g rather than f , in my notation) for which (i)
is close to (ii) (and so, also, empirically correct). I can therefore turn to elaborating and
endorsing the Straightforward Justification which I announced in Section 3.3.1: in short,
mathematical convenience and empirical correctness. For I now maintain that it applies
to all my four examples.
9Cf. also Kadanoff (2010, p. 20, Figure 5); Menon and Callender (2011) is a discussion of phase tran-
sitions concordant with mine, here and in Section 7. You may well ask: Is my mathematical example also
a good prototype for dissolving the corresponding alleged mystery in physics’ other ‘singular’ limits, e.g.
from optics, semiclassical mechanics and hydrodynamics? My view is: Yes. For a masterly philosopher’s
survey of the first two cases, cf. Belot (2005, Sections 3, 4 and Appendix).
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3.3.3 Developing the Straightforward Justification
This Justification consists of two obvious, very general, broadly instrumentalist, reasons
for using a model that adopts the limit N =∞: mathematical convenience, and empirical
adequacy (upto a required accuracy). So it also applies to many other models that are
almost never cited in philosophical discussions of emergence and reduction. In particular,
it applies to the many classical continuum models of fluids and solids, that are obtained
by taking a limit of a classical atomistic model as the number of atoms N tends to infinity
(in an appropriate way, e.g. keeping mass density constant).
‘Mathematical convenience and empirical correctness’: merits that are so easy to state!
But as all physicists know, and as echoed in the companion paper’s discussion of good
variables and approximation schemes: both can be very hard to attain—indeed, most of
a physicist’s work with a model is devoted to attaining them! But if they are attained
by adopting the limit N = ∞, they surely justify using the limit. (At least, they do so,
once we have disposed of any suspicious threat of mystery, such as refuting the atomic
constitution of matter!)
Though the details vary widely among the countless models adopting some N = ∞
limit, this justification involves two themes that are common to so many such models
that I should articulate them. The first theme is abstraction from finitary effects. That
is: the mathematical convenience and empirical adequacy of many such models arises, at
least in part, by abstracting from such effects. Consider (a) how transient effects die out
as time tends to infinity; and (b) how edge/boundary effects are absent in an infinitely
large system.10
The second theme is that the mathematics of infinity is often much more convenient
than the mathematics of the large finite. The paradigm example is of course the conve-
nience of the calculus: it is usually much easier to manipulate a differentiable real function
than some function on a large discrete subset of IR that approximates it.11 I shall just
spell out two advantages which are endemic. We can begin with the simple case where we
consider just the limit of the values, i.e. (i) of Section 3.2; so we set aside for the moment
the infinite model, (ii) of Section 3.2.
Thus consider a model in which the actual value of the relevant quantity for realistic,
i.e. large but finite, N , say N = 1023—the value v(f(1023)) in Section 3.2’s notation,
taking the state as understood—is negligibly close to the limit limN→∞ v(f(N)). And let
us assume that the value will remain close as N grows: so the values obey v(f(1023)) ≈
10As to (a), it is worth recalling the witty definition, attributed to Feynman, of that (invaluable but
much-contested!) concept, ‘equilibrium’: ‘the state the system gets into after the fast stuff [e.g. relaxation,
transients] is finished and the slow stuff [e.g. Poincare´ recurrence] has not yet started’. For apart from
being witty, the mention of ‘the slow stuff’ echoes Section 2’s warning (4:Unreal). That is: we should
beware that for very large times (not just for very large N) physical theories and models often become
unrealistic. And as to both (a) and (b), recall also footnote 4’s idea of intermediate asymptotics. Thus
Feynman’s witty definition should be revised along the lines ‘the state the system gets into after both
the really fast stuff, and the intermediate stuff, is finished and ...’.
11But smoothness is not everything! In some cases, as we saw with Section 3.3.2’s g∞, a discontinuous
function is more convenient than a continuous one.
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v(f(1046)) ≈ v(f(1069)) etc. Working with the limit rather than the actual value promises
two advantages. (Here of course we set aside Section 2’s warning (4:Unreal), that for many
models, the values for vastly larger N will eventually be unrealistic.)
The first is that it may be much easier to know, or at least estimate, the limit’s value
than the actual value—not least because of the first theme, the abstraction from finitary
effects. And ex hypothesi, working with it involves a negligible inaccuracy about the actual
value.
The second advantage is more theoretical, and will lead back to Section 3.2’s (ii), i.e.
the value of a limit quantity on an infinite system. The idea here is that for most models
and quantities f , there is, for a fixed N , not a single value v(f(N)), but a range of values,
to be considered. That is: v(f(N)) is a function of some other variable which has so
far been suppressed in my notation. And to make this function easily manipulated, e.g.
continuous or differentiable so that it can be treated with the calculus, we often need
to have each value of the function be defined as a limit (namely, of values of another
function).
Continuum models of solids and fluids provide paradigm examples of this. For exam-
ple, consider the mass density varying along a rod, or within a fluid. For an atomistic
model of the rod or fluid, that postulates N atoms per unit volume, the average mass-
density might be written as a function of both position x within the rod or fluid, and the
side-length L of the volume L3 centred on x, over which the mass-density is computed:
f(N,x, L). Now the point is that for fixed N , this function is liable to be intractably
sensitive to x and L. In particular, if atoms are or contain point-particles the function
will jump when L is varied so as to include or exclude one such particle. That is: it will
not be continuous in x and L. But by taking a continuum limit N →∞, with L→ 0 (and
atomic masses going to zero appropriately, so that quantities like density do not “blow
up”), we can define a continuous, maybe even differentiable, mass-density function ρ(x)
as a function of position—and then enjoy all the convenience of the calculus.
So much by way of showing in general terms how the use of an infinite limit N = ∞
can be justified—but not mysterious! At this point, the general philosophical argument
of this paper is complete! The subsequent Sections present my examples. It will be clear
that each example represents a large field of study. So to save space, I will have to be
brutally brief, both about the examples’ details and about references.
4 The method of arbitrary functions
My first example is the method of arbitrary functions in probability theory. It is a vener-
able tradition, initiated by Poincare´ in his Calcul de Probabilities (1896), and developed
by many authors including Borel, Fre´chet and Hopf. Recent presentations include En-
gel (1992) and Kritzer (2003); and von Plato (1983, 1994, pp. 168-178) summarizes the
history. But until recently it seems to have been largely neglected in the philosophy of
probability, despite its offering an attractive way to reconcile non-trivial probabilities (i.e.
probabilities that are neither 0 nor 1) with determinism at an ‘underlying’ level—and
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despite being the topic of Reichenbach’s dissertation!12
The main idea of the method is best introduced by an example, and I will follow
Poincare´ (and most discussions) in choosing a roulette wheel, with alternating arcs of red
and black (Section 4.1). Thus we will be concerned with the probability that the wheel
stops with a red (respectively, black) arc opposite a pointer. For this example, the main
idea will be that under certain assumptions, this probability tends to 0.5, as the number
N of arcs goes to infinity—whatever the details of the spinning and slowing of the wheel.
Section 4.1 will also discuss how this result can be generalized. Then in Section 4.2, I
describe how this equiprobability in the limit N → ∞ counts as emergent behaviour in
my sense, and how it illustrates my claims, (1:Deduce) etc.
4.1 Poincare´’s legacy
4.1.1 Poincare´’s roulette wheel
Suppose that a roulette wheel with arcs of red and black is spun many times, eventually
coming to a stop with a red or a black arc opposite a pointer. We suppose that it is spun
using various unknown initial conditions, i.e. initial positions relative to the pointer and
initial angular velocities; and that it is slowed and eventually stopped by some unknown
regime of friction. If this is all we know, we can conclude essentially nothing about the
long-run frequency (or probability, in any sense) of it stopping at Red (i.e. with a red
arc opposite the pointer). For the variety of initial conditions and the regime of friction,
taken together, amount to an unknown profile of biassing. This profile might be expressed
as a function giving, for each arc, the probability of the wheel stopping there. And for all
we have so far assumed, this function might make Red very probable (frequent)—or very
improbable (infrequent).
But suppose we also assume that:
(i): there are very many alternating arcs of red and black;
(ii): whatever the unknown profile of biassing might be, it favours and disfavours
large segments, i.e. segments each of which contains many red and many black arcs;
(iii): within one of these large segments, the bias is not too “wiggly” in the sense
that two adjacent arcs get nearly equal biasses.
Then we can be confident that the long-run frequency of Red (and of Black) is about
50%. For assumptions (i) to (iii) mean that if the profile is expressed as a probability
function, each of its peaks (corresponding to a favoured segment) contains many red and
many black arcs—and so do each of its troughs (corresponding to a disfavoured segment).
Thus the contribution of any peak to the overall probability (or frequency) of stopping at
Red will be about equal to the peak’s contribution to the probability of stopping at Black;
and similarly for any trough. So summing over all the peaks and troughs, the honours
12I say ‘until recently’ for two reasons. First: Strevens (2003) has revived the main idea; though he
is wary of the philosophical value of theorems about limiting behaviour, which figure prominently in the
tradition and which I will emphasize. For assessments of Strevens, cf. Colyvan (2005) and Werndl (2010).
Second: some recent papers revive the main idea: Sober (2010), Frigg and Hoefer (2010), Myrvold (2011).
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will be about even between Red and Black: there will be approximate equiprobability. To
sum up: (i) to (iii) imply that the idiosyncrasies of the biassing profile get washed out.
This is a beautiful and compelling idea; (originally due, apparently, to an 1886 book
by von Kries; cf. von Plato 1983, p. 38; 1994, p. 169). Expressing it in general and
probabilistic terms, we expect the following. Let a sample space (X,µ) be partitioned
into two subsets, say R and B, in a very “intricate” or “filamentous” way. Then for any
probability density function f that is not too “wiggly” (say: whose derivative is bounded:
| f ′ |< M) the probabilities of R and B are about equal:∫
R
fdµ ≈
∫
B
fdµ ≈ 1
2
. (4.1)
And we expect: that, for any boundM on the derivative of the density f , as the partition
becomes more intricate or filamentous, the difference from exact equiprobability (and so
to both probabilities equalling 1
2
) will tend to 0.
Indeed, Poincare´ (1912, p. 148ff.) turned this idea into a theorem, for a simple model
of the roulette wheel. So we take X to be the circle [0, 2pi], and the intricate partitioning
of X to be the division into N equal intervals, labelled alternatingly ‘red’ and ‘black’.
We assume the distribution of the point x ∈ X at which the wheel stops (i.e. which is
eventually opposite the pointer) is given by a probability density function f : [0, 2pi]→ IR.
We assume that f is differentiable, and its derivative is bounded byM , i.e. | f ′ |< M ∈ IR.
This of course makes precise assumptions (ii) and (iii) above.13 Then Poincare´ showed:
For any M ∈ IR, for all density functions f with derivative bounded by M ,
| f ′ |< M : as N = the number of arcs goes to infinity:∫
R f dµ ≡ prob(Red) → 12 ; and
∫
B f dµ ≡ prob(Black) → 12 .
To sum up: any biassing profile, no matter how wiggly, i.e. sensitive to the wheel’s angular
position (no matter how large M), can be washed out, so as to give equiprobability up to
an arbitrary accuracy, by a sufficiently intricate partition, i.e. by a sufficiently large N .
4.1.2 Generalizations: statistical stability
Subsequently, Poincare´’s theorem was generalized in two main ways. The first way was
historically earlier and is less connected to later developments, especially of probabilistic
methods in the study of dynamical systems. But it is easier to report since its conception
of the parameter N is very close to Poincare´’s original: it measures the fineness of the
partition of the sample space. In the second way, on the other hand, one takes a different
limit, usually depending on the details of the dynamical system concerned.
I will now sketch both ways. But as regards illustrating my claims about emergence,
I should stress the following points.
13We might also assume that the support of f intersects all N cells of the partition. This is one
way (among several) to represent the natural requirement that the wheel is spun fast enough, at least
sometimes, to prevent it stopping after just a few arcs have passed the pointer.
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(a) The illustrations do not need any of these generalizations; so the reader uniniter-
ested in probability theory can now skip to Section 4.2.
(b) The first way leads to illustrations of my claims that are exactly parallel to the
original illustration given by Poincare´’s theorem: a happy circumstance, since it supports
my view that my claims have a wide validity.
(c) The second way also illustrates my claims. But because a different, and even
system-dependent, limit is taken, these illustrations are rather different from the Poincare´
original. So to save space, I will not pursue the details.
(d) Poincare´’s theorem and its generalizations (in both ways) are very suggestive for
the philosophy of probability. As we will see, they hint that even with an underlying
determinism, taking an appropriate limit can define non-trivial probabilities that are “ob-
jectively correct”. But again, to save space, I must make a self-denying ordinance about
this.
The first way generalized the assumptions of the model of the wheel, and adapted
them to other chance set-ups. At first the conditions on the initial density function f
were weakened, by authors such as Borel and Fre´chet. In short, Borel assumed merely
that f was continuous; and Fre´chet merely that it was Riemann-integrable.
As to other chance set-ups, one paradigm example, which had the merit of extending
the method of arbitrary functions to densities of more than one variable, was Buffon’s
needle. In this problem a person throws a needle of length l on to a table on which a
pattern of parallel lines at a distance d (d > l) has been ruled. One asks: what is the
probability that the needle lands so as to intersect one of the lines? The elementary
treatment assumes that the point where the centre of the needle lands has a uniform
probability density (in the interval [0, d] for simplicity); and similarly that the angle
between the needle and the lines is uniformly distributed. It then follows by an elementary
argument that the probability of intersection is 2l/dpi.
But it is more realistic to assume that there is some unknown (“arbitrary”) density
function, perhaps peaked near the centre of the table, for the point where the centre of
the needle lands.14 Can we again apply von Kries’ and Poincare´’s idea that a more and
more intricate partition of the sample space (here, the table) will wash out the influence
of the peaks (and troughs) of the unknown density function? Yes! Borel indicated, and
Hostinsky´ showed in detail, that one can recover the familiar answer, 2l/dpi, by taking the
limit as the number N of lines on the table goes to infinity. For this theorem, Hostinsky´
assumed that the partial derivatives of the density function exist, are continuous and are
bounded. And he takes the limit, N →∞, while (i) the table size is constant, so that the
lines’ separation d goes to zero, and (ii) the ratio l/d is constant.
At this point, we must concede that the theorems reported so far have an obvious
limitation: the limit, N → ∞, is unrealistic. The number of arcs on a roulette wheel,
and the number of parallel lines on any table, is in fact fixed. (So this sense of being
unrealistic is more straightforward, and in practice arises for much smaller N , than the
idea of running up against the atomic constitution of matter, involved in my (4:Unreal) of
14Similarly, one might say, for the angle at which the needle lands. But I will not pursue how to relax
this assumption.
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Section 2.) Can we respect this fact, and yet still apply our initial idea that an intricate
partition of the sample space washes out the influence of the peaks and troughs of an
unknown density function?
As I see matters, there are two broad strategies one can adopt. Both are important;
and fortunately, they are compatible. The first strategy is piecemeal, and takes no limits.
One models each chance set-up as realistically as one wishes or is able to; and then
calculates, perhaps numerically, how wiggly (in some sense) the density function could
be, while yielding approximately the probabilities we observe and-or desire—e.g. for the
roulette wheel, equiprobability of Red and Black. This strategy is obviously sensible; and
in Section 4.2.2 we will see how it illustrates my claim (2:Before). But for now, I turn to
the other strategy.
This is what I called the ‘second way’ of generalizing Poincare´’s theorem. In short:
to derive the observed or desired probabilities, a different limit is taken. This strategy
can also be piecemeal: the details of the chance set-up suggest what limit to take. I
shall briefly report two impressively neat examples of this: Hopf’s analysis of the roulette
wheel, and Keller’s analysis of coin-tossing. Then I shall report how this second way leads
to the important idea of statistical stability.
Hopf’s idea is that for a roulette wheel with a fixed number N of arcs, the equiprobabil-
ity of Red and Black will follow from allowing higher and higher initial angular velocities.
Thus the basic insight is that even with N fixed, a higher initial angular velocity implies
that the width of an interval of velocities that lead to a specific arc stopping opposite
the pointer is smaller. Or to make the same point at the opposite extreme: with just
a few arcs (say, two!), and initial angular velocities so small that at most one rotation
occurs, even a ham-fisted croupier can fix the wheel, i.e. guarantee stopping at Red, or
at Black. In more detail: Hopf considers the total angle θ ∈ [0,∞] through which some
fiducial point on the wheel’s circumference turns before the wheel stops. Higher initial
angular velocities will make θ larger; and Red or Black is determined by θ mod 2pi. The
regime of spinning and friction is summarized in an unknown density function f on the
initial angular velocity ω, with bounded support. But higher velocities are considered
by translating f by a constant C, i.e. by defining f ∗(ω) := f(ω − C); and by letting
C → ∞. Hopf also allows the frictional force (the braking) to depend, not only on the
present angular velocity, but also on the angle so far turned through; that is, he allows
for an unbalanced wheel. Hopf then proves that as C →∞, the distribution of θ mod 2pi
tends to being uniform on [0, 2pi].
Keller gives a broadly similar analysis of coin-tossing (1986; developed by Diaconis et
al. 2007). He takes the coin to be a circular lamina which is initially horizontal: it is
tossed in a vertical line with an initial angular velocity ω and initial vertical velocity u,
and falls under gravity onto a horizontal table where it settles with either Heads or Tails
facing upward. Like Poincare´s or Hopf’s wheel, the sample space of initial conditions is
intricately partitioned into subsets that lead eventually, and deterministically, to Heads
or to Tails. But like Buffon’s needle, the sample space is two-dimensional. It is the
positive quadrant of the (ω, u)-plane. So the probabilities of Heads and Tails are given by
integrating over the Heads and Tails subsets, respectively, an unknown density function
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f(ω, u), which Keller takes to be continuous.
Keller shows that the pattern of Heads and Tails subsets is like a “hyperbolic zebra”.
Each subset is a thin strip lying along one of a series of hyperbolas, i.e. curves like
ω = nK/u with n a natural number. Besides, Heads strips alternate with Tails strips;
and for higher values of ω and u (i.e. as we move North-East in the positive quadrant),
the strips become thinner. This means that, in the now-familiar way, the integral of f , for
Heads or for Tails, over these higher values becomes less sensitive to wiggles in f . That is:
as the support of f (or even just f ’s “preponderant weight”) tends “North-East”, Heads
and Tails tend towards being equiprobable—whatever the density function.
Agreed, you might object that these analyses of Hopf and Keller, though neat, are
again unrealistic. No roulette wheel is spun, and no coin is tossed, arbitrarily fast! But
the reply is clear. It has two parts. Analyses like Hopf’s and Keller’s can give information
about the speed of convergence towards their limit; and this can reassure us that realistic
initial conditions lead to the desired probabilities (here: equiprobability), up to a good
accuracy, for a wide class of density functions. Here of course we return to two previous
themes:
(i) in general terms, the two merits of Section 3.3.3’s Straightforward Justification of
taking a limit: mathematical convenience and empirical success; and
(ii) specifically, the value of modelling without taking a limit, i.e. the first strategy
above, and my claim (2:Before). Recall my remark above that the two strategies are
compatible.
Finally, Hopf’s and Keller’s analyses prompt the idea of statistical stability, which has
been very important for the probabilistic study of dynamical systems. I will not go in to
the measure-theoretic technicalities (about absolute continuity and types of convergence)
that are needed for an exact definition, but just convey the main idea. (This occurs,
under the label ‘statistical regularity’ in Hopf’s own analysis of the roulette wheel.) The
general scenario is that we are given: (i) two probability spaces (X,µ) and (Y, ν), i.e.
µ, ν are probability measures on appropriate fields of subsets of X,Y respectively; (ii) a
family of maps Fλ : X → Y , labelled by a parameter λ ∈ IR or perhaps ∈ N. Thus in our
examples above, X was the space of initial conditions and Y was the two element space
{ Red, Black } or { Heads, Tails }; and each Fλ is a deterministic map sending an initial
condition x ∈ X to an outcome y ∈ Y .
Returning to the general scenario: µλ := µ ◦ F−1λ is a probability measure on Y , and
we can ask whether there is a measure on Y to which µλ converges as λ→∞: or even a
measure on Y to which µλ converges, for all µ onX in some suitable class. If so, we say the
family Fλ is statistically stable. In studying complicated, even “chaotic”, deterministic
systems, this idea has an important special case: namely, X = Y, µ = ν, λ ∈ N and
the family Fλ arises just by iterating a map T : X → X, i.e. Fλ := T λ represents a
discrete-time evolution. In this case, the limit measure, µ∗ say, characterizes the long-
time statistical behaviour of the system. In particular, it is readily shown to be invariant
under the time-evolution. That is, T induces an evolution PT on measures (and their
densities) in the natural way, and we have: PT (µ
∗) = µ∗.
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4.2 The claims illustrated by emergent equiprobability
I turn to describing how the limiting probabilities of Section 4.1 count as emergent behav-
iour in my sense, and how they illustrate my claims (1:Deduce), (2:Before) and (3:Herring)
(listed in Section 1.2). As I announced, I will for simplicity emphasize the original Poincare´
theorem, stated at the end of Section 4.1.1. But it will be clear how the claims are also
illustrated by the generalizations given in Section 4.1.2, including the closing idea of an
invariant limit measure µ∗.
The illustrations unfold immediately, once we stipulate that the limiting probabilities
are to be the emergent behaviour. For me, this means behaviour that is novel or surprising,
and robust, relative to a comparison class. As discussed in the companion paper, this class
is liable to be fixed contextually, and even to be vague or subjective—but nevermind,
since there does not need to be an exact meaning of ‘emergence’. Here I concede that the
limiting probabilities, especially the equiprobability of Red and Black, or Heads and Tails,
are not novel or surprising—though I submit that it is surprising that one can deduce
them from an arbitrary density function. In any case, they are robust in a vivid sense:
the whole point of the method of arbitrary functions is that they are invariant under a
choice of a density function from a wide class.
4.2.1 Emergence in the limit: with reduction—and without
As to (1:Deduce): we have ‘reduction as deduction’ in as strong a sense as you could
demand—provided we take the limit. Thus for Poincare´’s theorem, we take Tt to be just
the statement of equiprobability in the limit of infinite N , and Tb to be a model of the
wheel, including enough measure theory and calculus to cover both: (i) the postulation of
various possible density functions f on [0, 2pi]; and (ii) consideration of the infinite limit
N →∞. And similarly for Section 4.1’s other examples.
(1:Deduce) also concerns “the other side of the coin”: how the emergent behaviour,
here equiprobability, is not deducible, if we do not take the limit but instead confine Tb
to finite N . This also is illustrated by Section 4.1. Thus in particular, for Poincare´’s
roulette wheel: For any finite N , no matter how large, equiprobability will fail, as badly
as you may care to require, for a sufficiently “wiggly” density function, i.e. a sufficiently
position-sensitive biassing regime. That is, we have:
For all ε > 0, for all positive integers N , there isM ∈ IR and a density function
f with | f ′ |< M such that: ∫R f dµ ≡ prob(Red) > 1− ε.
So here is emergence without reduction to a weaker finitary Tb. Since this weaker Tb is a
salient theory, one can be tempted to speak of irreducibility. Similarly for Section 4.1’s
other examples.
It is worth displaying the two sides of (1:Deduce)’s “coin”—equiprobability’s deducibil-
ity in the limit, and its non-deducibility before—in terms of a shift of quantifiers. Thus
the “form” of Poincare´’s theorem is:
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∀ε > 0,∀M ∈ IR, ∀f with | f ′ |< M , ∃N s.t. ∀N∗ > N : | ∫R;N∗arcs f dµ− 12 |
< ε;
while “the other side of the coin” is:
∀ε > 0,∀N, ∃M ∈ IR, and f with | f ′ |< M , s.t.: | ∫R;Narcs f dµ− 12 | > ε.
One can easily check that in Section 4.1’s other examples, including Buffon’s needle,
Hopf’s roulette wheel and Keller’s tossed coin, the two sides of (1:Deduce)’s “coin” involve
a similar quantifier-shift.
Finally, I stress the point announced in Sections 1.1 and 3.1: that the limits we are
concerned with are in no way singular—so a singular limit is not necessary for emergence.
Nor is there any infinite system corresponding to N = ∞ (i.e. σ(∞) in Section 3.1’s
notation). For the roulette wheel, that would mean a division of [0, 2pi] in to a denumerable
number of equal-length segments! And similarly for the other limits: e.g. Hopf’s roulette
wheel spun, or Keller’s coin tossed, with an infinite initial angular velocity.15
4.2.2 Emergence before the limit
(2:Before) claims that before the limit, there is emergence in a weaker but still vivid sense.
Here the weaker sense is approximate rather than exact equiprobability, for some realistic
model of the roulette wheel (or other chance set-up). So we already saw in Section 4.1.2
how the method of arbitrary functions illustrates this claim: namely, in the discussion
of the finite parameter case, both (i) as a first strategy for defending Poincare´’s roulette
wheel and (ii) as a reply to the parallel objection to Hopf or Keller, that no wheel is spun,
no coin is tossed, arbitrarily fast. For both (i) and (ii), we calculate, perhaps numerically,
how wiggly (in some sense) the density function could be, while yielding approximately
the probabilities we observe and-or desire—e.g. for the roulette wheel, equiprobability of
Red and Black.
Speaking of desire raises issues of engineering: indeed, of the profitability of casinos.
We know that casinos manage to get profitably close to equiprobability, with some small
number, N ≈ 50, of arcs. And we surmise that even if they had a worryingly wiggly
f , they could get profitably close to equiprobability by putting N up to say about 200;
or—following Hopf’s idea—by spinning the wheel, on average, some two to three times
faster. Here we meet the multi-faceted, even interest-relative, even subjective, question:
how close is close enough? ‘Close enough for all practical purposes’: but what exactly are
the practical purposes? How wiggly an f need the casino guard against?
But I submit that this is a question for casino-owners—who can no doubt pay staff
well enough to answer it accurately for them. At our (typically philosophical!) level of
15I said there can be no division of [0, 2pi] in to a denumerable number of equal-length segments. No
sooner said than doubted—as so often in philosophy. I am grateful to Alan Hajek for pointing me to
Edward Nelson’s adaptation of the ideas of non-standard analysis to probability theory; cf. Nelson (1987,
especially Chapters 4 to 7).
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generality, we do not need to try and answer it. For us, it is enough that given a resolution
of this and similar questions, including vaguenesses, we get a notion of approximate
equiprobability, which can indeed be deduced from a Tb with parameters that are not
only finite, but also realistic. In particular, Tb can imply profitable—for the gamblers:
indiscernible—closeness to equiprobability, using some N ≈ 50 arcs on the roulette wheel,
and an initial velocity of some 10pi to 30pi radians per second (5 to 15 revolutions per
second).
4.2.3 Supervenience is a red herring
I turn to my third, ancillary, claim (3:Herring). Namely: although various supervenience
theses are true, they yield little or no insight into emergence, or more generally, into “what
is going on” in the example.
This is well illustrated by Poincare´’s roulette wheel, and Section 4.1’s other examples.
For any sequence of spins of the wheel, with any number N of arcs, and any regime
governing its initial velocities, the frequency of Red is of course determined by, super-
venient upon, all the microscopic details of the wheel and its many spinnings.16 This
supervenience thesis holds for a finite sequence of spins; or an infinite one, with frequency
defined as limiting relative frequency. And there are analogous supervenience theses for
probability, rather than frequency: the probability of Red is determined by the details of
the wheel, especially the choice of probability density function. Similarly of course, for
coin-tosses, and the frequency or probability of Heads.
I submit that these supervenience theses, whether for frequency or probability, shed
no light on the matters at hand. For they make no connection with the basic idea of the
method of arbitrary functions: that intricate partitions of a sample space can wash out
the peaks and troughs of an unknown density function, and secure robust probabilities.
This is a good illustration of my general reasons (in Section 1.2) for supervenience theses’
irrelevance: that they make no connection between their idea of a variety, perhaps even
infinity, of ways to have the higher-level property P , and the limit processes on which the
example turns. Thus here, P is the property that a frequency or probability of Red (or
of Heads) is 1
2
, or is the property of two events being equiprobable; and the example’s
limit processes are the number of arcs, or the initial velocities, going to infinity, so as to
implement the basic idea of washing out peaks and troughs. Or we can eschew the limit
and use only finite parameters, as in (2:Before). But again, these supervenience theses
shed no helpful light.17
16In Section 4.1, we assumed, for the most part implicitly, that these details were based on classical
mechanics. But the same supervenience thesis would hold if we assumed instead that they were based on
quantum theory. At least, this is so if we set aside the quantum measurement problem, which threatens
to deny us any definite macroscopic events. The companion paper discusses some dangers in the idea of
supervenience on the microscopic details, “whatever they might be”.
17A caveat. I agree that these supervenience theses are relevant to the philosophy of probability,
especially for an empiricist. For example: if we maintain that the empiricist should accept the model’s
microscopic details, say because they are “occurrent”, then the supervenience theses for frequencies
support the idea that they should also accept frequencies—as a metaphysical free lunch, as people say.
But in (d) at the start of Section 4.1.2, I foreswore the philosophy of probability: for some discussion in
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5 Fractals
My second example is fractals, or rather, one small aspect of this large field: namely, the
idea that a set of spatial points, i.e a subset of IRn (n = 1, 2, ...), can have a dimension
that is not an integer. As we shall see, one can define various notions of dimension; and
much of the discussion and results carry over to spaces more general than Euclidean space
IRn. However, I will emphasise one notion of dimension, scaling dimension (also known
as: similarity dimension), and confine myself to IRn. Even a very short introduction to
this topic (Section 5.1) will be enough to illustrate my claims. For my first three claims,
details are in Section 5.2. The discussion is similar to that in Section 4.2.18
But as I mentioned in Section 2, I propose for fractals to also discuss my fourth claim
(4:Unreal): that for large but finite N , the example becomes unrealistic—for reasons that
are usually ignored in discussions of emergence. I do this in Section 5.3. This will mean
that in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, the pure mathematics of dimension in Euclidean geometry
will be prominent: the empirical world will come to the foreground only in Section 5.3.
For in this fractals example, large N corresponds to very small length-scales; so that here,
(4:Unreal) amounts to a ‘No’ answer to the question ‘Is fractal geometry the geometry of
nature?’ In other words: (4:Unreal) denies that fractal descriptions of physical objects
are literally true: a denial which my first three claims can largely ignore. Section 5.4 will
sum up.
5.1 Self-similarity and dimension as an exponent
The key innovation of fractals is to extend, from familiar geometric objects such as squares
and cubes to much more “irregular” sets, two related ideas: (i) self-similarity and (ii)
dimension as an exponent.
Recall that a square with edge l is the union of l2 unit squares; e.g. a square whose
edge is l = 3 units long is the union of 32 = 9 unit squares. And a cube with edge l is the
union of l3 unit cubes; e.g. a cube whose edge is l = 3 units long is the union of 33 = 27
unit cubes. These examples exhibit both the ideas (i) and (ii), as follows.
(i): The square or cube is a union of smaller copies of itself; and the decomposition
involved can be iterated indefinitely—imagine repeatedly shrinking the unit of length l
by some factor.
(ii): In the formula for the measure (area, volume) of the object (i.e. the number
of unit building blocks in it), the dimension occurs as an exponent, and takes the same
value, however fine the decomposition i.e. however small we choose the unit of length.
number of unit blocks in object with edge l = ldimension of object. (5.1)
the context of the method of arbitrary functions, cf. the papers by Frigg and Hoefer, and Myrvold cited
in footnote 12.
18I should mention a reason for restricting attention to Euclidean space IRn. Namely: Euclidean
geometry admits similarity (of triangles and other figures), while non-Euclidean geometries in general
do not; and on our approach, the definition of fractals needs the idea of similar figures. Section 5.3 will
return to this point.
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So the main idea of fractals is that similarly:—
(i’): Some “irregular” sets of points are unions of smaller copies of themselves; where,
again, the decomposition involved can be iterated indefinitely. Among these sets will be
some famous examples, which were treated as “pathological” when first explored some
hundred years ago: in particular, the Cantor ‘middle thirds’ set C which is a subset of
the unit interval [0, 1] ⊂ IR (1872), and the Koch snowflake K which is a subset of the
unit square (1906).
(ii’): Applying the idea of eq. 5.1 to such sets, we find that they have non-integral di-
mensions. For example, the Cantor set has dimension about 0.63, and the Koch snowflake
has dimension about 1.26.
These ideas are connected to my themes of emergence and reduction, owing to the fact
that these sets are defined by taking a limit N →∞ of an iterated process of definition.
Thus in Section 5.2 I will take non-integral dimension to be the emergent (i.e. novel and
robust behaviour), which is deduced (and so reduced!) in the limit.
I shall now develop ideas (i) and (ii), especially eq. 5.1, more formally. But how
fractals illustrate my claims about emergence and reduction does not depend on these
details, and the reader uninterested in geometry can now skip to Section 5.2. But I
should also stress, on the other hand, that what follows is the merest glimpse of the
modern theory of dimension. I shall rein in the exposition, and say only enough: (a) to
define the scaling dimension, and see how it can be non-integral (Section 5.1.1), and (b)
to sketch how scaling dimension relates to other concepts of dimension (Section 5.1.2).
5.1.1 Examples: scaling dimension
I begin by defining the Cantor set and Koch snowflake. This will show that they are
self-similar, i.e. unions of smaller copies of themselves; and this will imply that using eq.
5.1’s idea of dimension as exponent, both these sets have a non-integer dimension. Then
I give a general definition of scaling dimension.
5.1.1.A: The Cantor set C:— This is defined as the intersection of infinitely many
other subsets, which we will call ‘stages’, labelled 0, 1, 2,... The unit interval [0, 1] is stage
0. After stage 0, each later stage is obtained by deleting the open middle third of each
closed interval of its predecessor. So stage 1 is [0, 1], minus its open middle third. That
is: stage 1 is [0, 1
3
] ∪ [2
3
, 1]. Then stage 2 is defined by deleting the open middle third of
each of [0, 1
3
] and [2
3
, 1]. So stage 2 consists of four disjoint closed intervals: it is the set
[0, 1
9
] ∪ [2
9
, 1
3
] ∪ [2
3
, 7
9
] ∪ [8
9
, 1]. And so on. Thus stage N is the union of 2N intervals, each
interval being of length (1
3
)N . So the total length of stage N is 2N × (1
3
)N ≡ (2
3
)N . So as
N goes to infinity, the length of stage N goes to 0.
C is defined to be the intersection of all the stages. Thus C contains those real numbers
between 0 and and 1 whose ternary expansion (i.e. using digits 0,1,2) has no digit 1: so
C is uncountable. Agreed, C is hard to visualize! Its topological properties include: it is
closed, it is nowhere-dense (i.e. its closure has an empty interior) and its complement is
a dense subset of [0, 1].
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Now we apply to C the idea of eq. 5.1. Think of C as the unit block of “Cantor
type”. And observe that C is the union of two shrunken copies of itself, each smaller by
a factor of 3. That is: one shrunken copy is built by applying the infinite ‘delete and
take intersection’ process to [0, 1
3
], and the other shrunken copy by applying the process
to [2
3
, 1].19
This observation can be reproduced at the next scale up. That is: we can define
the “Cantor type” object of scale 3, call it C ′, as the set that results from applying the
infinite ‘delete and take intersection’ process to [0, 3], rather than to [0, 1]. Then just as
our original C is the union of two shrunken copies of itself, each smaller by a factor of 3,
so also is C ′. That is: C ′ is the union of two unit-size Cantor sets. Now we apply the
idea of eq. 5.1, getting
number of unit Cantor sets in Cantor object of scale 3 ≡ 2 = 3dimension of C. (5.2)
Now we recall that for any logarithm base a, b = c(loga b/ loga c), so that in the case of
interest: 2 = 3(log 2/ log 3). Here we drop the suffix stating the base, since the ratio of
logarithms is independent of the base. That is: the dimension of C is log 2/ log 3: which
is about 0.63.
5.1.1.B: The Koch snowflake K:— This also has an iterative construction. Roughly
speaking: we erect smaller and smaller equilateral triangles in the middles of the sides
of a polygon, and define K as the limit. Thus stage 0 is an equilateral triangle. Stage
N + 1 is constructed from stage N by replacing each line segment of stage N by 4 line
segments, each one-third the length of the original. It follows that the perimeter of the
polygon grows without bound: if P is the perimeter of the initial triangle, then stage N
consists of 3× 4N segments each of length P/3N+1, so that its perimeter is (4/3)NP .
So this is different from the Cantor set in that K is not itself the union of similar
smaller snowflakes. But each “side” of K is the union of four smaller similar curves, each
smaller by a factor 3. So applying again the idea of eq. 5.1, we get:
4 = 3dimension of K so that: dimension of K =
log 4
log 3
≈ 1.26. (5.3)
5.1.1.C: Scaling dimension defined:— With these examples as motivation, I proceed to
a general definition. The main effort is in defining the preliminary notion of self-similarity.
For in general we need to allow that the smaller copies (of which the object, i.e. set, we
are concerned with is a union) overlap, i.e. have non-empty intersection. But we require
them to overlap “minimally” in the sense that their intersection is of lower dimension—
in the usual integer-valued sense!—than the copies themselves. Examples include: two
continuous curves that have a finite set of points in common; two rectangles that have
parts of the boundaries in common.
19This observation can be iterated “downward”. C is also the union of 22 shrunken copies of itself,
each smaller by a factor of 32. And C is the union of 23 shrunken copies of itself, each smaller by a factor
of 33; and so on... for each N , C is the union of 2N shrunken copies of itself, each smaller by a factor of
3N .
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For the moment, I will take the usual integer-valued notion of dimension for granted;
(Section 5.1.2 will rehearse a standard definition of it). Then we say that a set X ⊂ IRn is
a almost-disjoint union of two sets Y, Z iff X = Y ∪Z and Y ∩Z has lower dimension than
the dimensions of Y and Z. One similarly defines almost-disjoint unions of more than
two sets. And one defines X to be self-similar if it is an almost-disjoint union of shrunken
copies of itself. Here ‘shrunken copies’ can be made precise by using the vector space
structure of IRn: (i) to scalar-multiply the vectors in the set X by a common contraction
factor, and (ii) to translate the resulting shrunken copies out of coincidence with one
another, so as to give an almost-disjoint union. Thus we say: X is self-similar if it is the
almost-disjoint union of m copies of X, each contracted by a common factor k, and then
translated by a (non-common) vector v. Thus in an obvious notation
X = ∪mi=1 [
1
k
X + vi] . (5.4)
Then we define the scaling dimension of X to be: logm/ log k.
5.1.2 Generalizations: three other concepts of dimension
Our definition of scaling dimension, eq. 5.4, is limited to exactly self-similar objects. But
the idea that a dimension occurring as an exponent in a power law can be non-integral
can be developed for much more general kinds of object. These include: (i) allowing
the contraction factor for the building-block set X to be anisotropic (called ‘self-affinity’,
instead of ‘self-similarity’); and (ii) introducing probabilities governing the contractions
and-or translations of X, so that one considers an ensemble of random fractals, almost
all of which are not exactly self-similar.
These developments have both empirical and theoretical aspects: which have of course
influenced one another over the years. In this Subsection, I round off our glimpse of the
modern theory of dimension by sketching some of these developments: first the empirical,
then the theoretical. There will be a common key idea: to substitute for Section 5.1.1’s
contractions of a figure, the complementary idea of contracting a grid of lines (or planes
or hyperplanes), or something analogous to such a grid, like a family of boxes or discs
that appropriately cover the figure.
5.1.2.A: Empirical aspects:— Countless empirical studies have found power law behav-
iour with a dimension as a non-integral exponent. One famous example is Richardson’s
(1961) discussion of measuring the length of a coastline by traversing it from point to
point, as if with a pair of dividers. Richardson envisages indefinitely improving the res-
olution, i.e. reducing the divider-distance. For a continuous curve, we would have the
familiar limit: as the resolution length (divider-distance) δ → 0, the number of steps n(δ)
needed to traverse the coastline grows unboundedly in such a way that the estimate of
the length, n(δ) δ, tends to l: where l is the usual length of the curve, given by calculus
as l =
∫
ds. We can express this as a power law with the curve’s dimension D = 1 as an
exponent. Namely, we would have:
n(δ) ≈ l/δ ≡ l/δ1 ≡ l/δD with D = 1. (5.5)
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But applying the dividers method to ever-larger scale maps suggests instead that as δ → 0,
the estimated length n(δ) δ increases without bound, i.e. n(δ) ≈ constant × δD with D
strictly greater than 1. This is of course like Section 5.1.1’s discussion of the length, and
the dimension, of (the side of) the Koch snowflake: except that intuitively a coastline has
bays as well as promontories—concave portions as well as convex ones. But this can be
modelled using random fractals, as mentioned in (ii) above.
There are many other examples of such empirical power laws: often, as in this example,
with the quantity of interest, f say, proportional to a power of a resolution δ: f =
constant × δD. In many cases, of course, the exponent represents, not length, area or
volume, but some other physical quantity. But there are also plenty of cases where the
exponent is a dimension (in our sense, not the more general sense of ‘physical dimension’ !).
Thus Brady and Ball (1984) studied the dendritic growth of copper electrodeposited on
to an initially pointlike cathode. They found that the volume (or mass) of copper was
proportional to RD, where R is the radius and D was about 2.43—in good agreement
with computer-simulations.
5.1.2.B: Theoretical aspects:— For my purposes, the main point here is that the modern
theory of dimension recognizes several different concepts, and of course includes many
theorems relating the agreements and differences in the dimensions assigned to various
sets. I shall sketch three such concepts. As I mentioned at the start of this Subsection,
they share a common general idea: viz. successively finer covers of the set in question, or
something analogous like successively finer grids of lines or (hyper)planes.
I start, for the sake of completeness, with the traditional, i.e. topological, integer-
valued notion. My other two notions are the Hausdorff dimension and the box dimension.
They are like scaling dimension, not just in taking non-integral values; but also in the
general underlying reason for this, viz. some quantity showing power law behaviour.
Besides, the dimension they assign to an exactly self-similar set, as in eq. 5.4, is equal
to the scaling dimension: viz., in the notation of eq. 5.4, logm/ log k (Falconer 2003, pp.
xxiv, 129; Hastings and Sugihara 1993, p. 31, 34, 40). So they are generalizations of
scaling dimension, in the clear sense that if a set X has a scaling dimension D, then it
also has both Hausdorff and box dimension equal to D. But as I mentioned, each of these
notions also applies to a much wider class of sets. Besides, they have in common that the
power law behaviour occurs as a cover of a set, or something analogous like a grid of lines
or planes, becomes finer. But they are inequivalent notions: for some sets, their values
disagree.
Topological dimension: This can be defined for a general topological space; but I re-
strict myself to compact subsets of IRn. There are various ways to motivate the definition.
Among the clearest is to consider the task of covering the unit square with closed rectan-
gles in such a way that as few rectangles as possible have points in common. Suppose
we cover the square with a lattice of rectangles; (so the square is their almost-disjoint
union). Then a point at a corner of the lattice is in four rectangles. If instead we stagger
the rectangles, giving a brick-wall pattern, then each point at a corner is in only three
rectangles. On the other hand, it seems this arrangement cannot be improved—except of
course by making the rectangles so that we only need two, or even one(!), to cover the
33
square. Similarly in three dimensions. A few minutes’ reflection suggests that: (a) for cov-
ering the unit cube with arbitrarily small closed rectangular solids, one can arrange that
no point in the cube is contained in more than four solids; but (b) for sufficiently small
solids, at least four solids have a common point. Similarly, one naturally conjectures, for
unit hypercubes [0, 1]n ⊂ IRn: (a) [0, 1]n can be decomposed as an almost-disjoint union
of arbitrarily small n-rectangles, in such a way that no more than n + 1 of them have a
common point; but (b) n+ 1 is the least such number, i.e. in any such decomposition of
[0, 1]n, there must be a point common to at least n+ 1 of the n-rectangles.
This prompts the following definitions. Let X ⊂ IRn. Let U be a cover of X by finitely
many sets, and let δ > 0. U is called an δ-cover if each element of U has diameter less
than δ. (The diameter diam U of a set U is supx,y∈U | x− y |.) The order, ord U , of U is
the natural number m ∈ N for which there is a point of X belonging to m elements of U ,
but no point belonging to m+1 elements. Then we say that X has topological dimension
m iff m is the least integer for which, for any δ > 0, there is a finite closed δ-cover of X
of order m+ 1.
This definition is the beginning of a rich theory. In particular, one shows that it
gives the intuitive verdicts about familiar sets of points: finite sets of points, lines, planes
and solids get dimensions 0, 1, 2 and 3 respectively; and so on for IRn. One shows that
dimension thus defined is a topological invariant. It is also easy to check that the Cantor
set has topological dimension 0.
Hausdorff dimension: The definition proceeds in two main steps. (1): We first sum the
diameters, raised to a power s, of the elements of a cover of the set X, and consider the
limit as the supremum of these diameters goes to 0. As the set X varies, we get for fixed
s a function Hs, which is (an outer measure, and thereby) a measure on an appropriate
field of sets—which includes the Borel sets. (2): These measures, parameterized by s,
have the curious property that for any given set X, the value Hs(X) is zero or infinity
for most s. It is this property that yields the definition of the dimension. The details are
as follows.
(1): Let X ⊂ IRn and s > 0 and δ > 0. We define
Hsδ (X) = inf Σ
∞
i=1(diamUi)
s (5.6)
where the infimum is over all countable δ-covers {Ui} of X. (One can check that Hsδ is
an outer measure on IRn.) Now we let δ → 0:
Hs(X) := limδ→0Hsδ (X) = supδ>0H
s
δ (X). (5.7)
This limit exists; but may be infinite because Hsδ increases as δ decreases. H
s is an outer
measure, and so restricts to a measure on the σ-field of Hs-measurable sets. This includes
the Borel sets, and the measure is called Hausdorff s-dimensional measure.
(2): For any X, Hs(X) is clearly non-increasing as s increases from 0 to ∞. And if
s < t, then Hsδ (X) > δ
s−tH tδ(X). This implies that if H
t(X) is positive, then Hs(X) is
infinite. So there is a unique value, dimH(X), the Hausdorff dimension of X, such that
Hs(X) =∞ if 0 ≤ s ≤ dimH(X) ; and Hs(X) = 0 if dimH(X) ≤ s ≤ ∞ . (5.8)
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A rich theory ensues: for its beginning, cf. Falconer (2003, Chapter 2).
Box dimension: The idea is to count the minimum number N(δ) of closed n-cubes of
a given edge-length δ that cover the set in question, and to consider the limit as δ → 0.
In the now-familiar way suggested by the scaling dimension, logm/ log k, of eq. 5.4, the
dimension is defined as
limδ→0
logN(δ)
− log δ . (5.9)
The minus sign is needed to make the dimension positive, since log δ → −∞ as δ → 0.
In fact, we can work, equivalently and conveniently, with the smallest number of closed
balls of radius δ.
As to the conditions for the limit to exist, I here just recall that any sequence {an} of
real numbers has a lim inf and a lim sup (which may equal ±∞), defined as follows: lim
inf an is the number a such that: (i) for all ε > 0, an is eventually forever greater than
a − ε, i.e. ∀ε > 0,∃N, ∀M > N, aM > a − ε; and (ii) for all ε > 0, the sequence forever
returns to being less than a+ ε, i.e. ∀ε > 0,∀N, ∃M > N, aM < a+ ε. The requirements
(i) and (ii) imply that such a number a is unique; and if there is no such real number, we
set lim inf an = −∞. Similarly for lim sup. (One could summarize in topological jargon
by saying that lim inf an is the (possibly infinite) smallest of the sequence’s accumulation
points; and lim sup an is the (possibly infinite) largest of its accumulation points.) So for
any bounded set X ⊂ IRn, we can define the lower and upper box dimension by
dimLB(X) := lim infδ→0
logN(δ,X)
− log δ ; dim
U
B(X) := lim supδ→0
logN(δ,X)
− log δ ; (5.10)
and then we say that if these values are equal, that value isX’s box dimension=: dimB(X).
Again, a rich theory ensues (Falconer 2003, Chapter 3; Barnsley 1988, Chapter 5). For
example: (i) familiar “regular” sets like points, lines and planes have box dimension equal
to their topological dimension; (ii) for any set X, dimH(X) ≤ dimLB(X) ≤ dimUB(X); and
(iii) for a wide class of sets, the box and Hausdorff dimension are equal—but the box
dimension has the advantage that it is often easier to calculate.
5.2 The claims illustrated by emergent dimensions
I turn to describing how the non-integral dimensions of Section 5.1 count as emergent
behaviour in my sense, and how they illustrate my claims (1:Deduce), (2:Before) and
(3:Herring) (listed in Section 1.2). As I announced, the illustrations do not need all the
details, especially of Section 5.1.2. To keep things simple and brief, I specialize to sets like
the Cantor set and Koch snowflake (Section 5.1.1) that are defined by taking a limit of an
iterated process of definition. Then the illustrations unfold immediately, once we stipulate
that having a non-integral dimension is to be the emergent property or behaviour: i.e.
novel (or surprising) and robust, relative to a comparison class.
Certainly, non-integer dimensions are novel (more so than Section 4’s limiting prob-
abilities). And they are ‘robust’ in at least two senses. First, the scaling dimension of
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Section 5.1.1 obviously takes the same value for congruent sets of points, and for enlarged
and reduced versions of a given set: this invariance is a kind of robustness. Second and
more interesting: as discussed in Section 5.1.2, there are various novel notions of dimen-
sion which can take non-integer values, and which are “cousins” of each other in various
ways. They share the ideas of dimension as an exponent, and of taking successively finer
covers or grids; and for wide classes of sets, their values agree. In particular, the values
of Section 5.1.1’s scaling dimension are endorsed by Section 5.1.2’s Hausdorff and box
dimension. So indeed it is fair to talk of ‘emergent dimensions’.
5.2.1 Emergence in the limit: with reduction—and without
As to (1:Deduce): we have ‘reduction as deduction’ in as strong a sense as you could
demand—provided we take the limit. The general situation is that at stage N = 0, a
“regular” set is given. Here “regular” can mean various things depending on the context,
but I will take it to always imply having a well-defined topological dimension. Another
set is then defined, yielding stage N = 1, by a process that can be iterated to give sets at
stages N = 2, 3, .... At all finite stages, the defined sets are regular. And for a wide class
of cases (including Section 5.1.1’s Cantor set C and and Koch snowflake K), the stages’
dimensions are all equal—and is the integer you would expect. For example, at stage N
for the Cantor set C, the defined set, CN , is a union of closed sub-intervals of the unit
interval; and its topological dimension is 1, as you would expect. Similarly for the stages
in defining K. But the “irregular” set is defined by taking the limit N →∞. In general
it has a different topological dimension: thus dim(C) = 0 6= dim(CN) ≡ 1. So topological
dimension is not continuous in the limit; (footnote 3 notes how this shows discontinuous
limits do not imply emergence). And more important for us: according to one or more of
the novel notions of dimension (scaling, Hausdorff, box etc.), the set has a non-integral
dimension. For example, C’s dimension (according to all three notions) is about 0.63.
Thus the non-integral dimension, the emergent behaviour, is indeed deduced (and so
reduced!) in the limit. In terms of my mnemonic notations: (1:Deduce) is illustrated as
follows. Take as Tb the theory of scaling dimension, and-or one or more of its generaliza-
tions like the Hausdorff or box dimension; and if you wish, include, as a sub-theory, the
topological theory of dimension. Take as Tt the assignments of non-integral dimensions
to sets like C,K; (and if Tb includes the generalizations, to other sets that are not exactly
self-similar). Then clearly, we have reduction: Tb contains Tt! (Or in terms of Section
3.3.2’s quantity f whose value, 1 or 0, records the presence or absence of the emergent
property: f∞ = 1.)
But there is “the other side of the coin”: the emergent behaviour is not deducible if
we do not take the limit. Notice that the situation is a bit different from that for the
method of arbitrary functions (Section 4.2.1). There, all one needed so as to deduce the
emergent behaviour was consideration of the limit. Here, one needs ideas that go beyond
the topological notion of dimension—discontinuous though it is, in the limits concerned.
One needs the idea of dimension as an exponent, as developed in scaling dimension or its
generalizations. But notwithstanding this difference, the main point is that (1:Deduce)’s
second claim holds true again. Namely: if Tb is just the traditional theory of dimension,
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there is no reduction; and because this weaker theory is salient, it is tempting to speak of
irreducibility.
Finally, note another contrast with the method of arbitrary functions. Section 4.2.1
ended by noting that no roulette wheel has infinitely many arcs; nor is any wheel spun
infinitely fast. In Section 3.1’s notation: there was no infinite system σ(∞). But in the
fractals example, there are such infinite systems—the sets C,K ⊂ IRn etc.—and the whole
discussion focusses on them.
5.2.2 Emergence before the limit
(2:Before) claims that before the limit, there is emergence in a weaker but still vivid
sense. It is illustrated in a manner parallel to the method of arbitrary functions. Thus
recall Section 4.2.2’s discussion of approximate equiprobability in, for example, a casino’s
roulette wheel. For fractals, the obvious analogue of the wheel is a computer running
some software so as to produce a simulation of some fractal set, by iterating the steps
of its definition some finite number N of times. The most obvious case is computer
graphics software, producing an approximate or coarse-grained image of a fractal set.
Nowadays, such images are ubiquitous in films and games, superseding the static images
in yesteryear’s lavish books (e.g. Peitgen and Richter 1986).
It is easy to check that all of Section 4.2.2’s discussion—about how one can calcu-
late, perhaps numerically, how closely a set-up approximates equiprobability, and how we
philosophers can leave it to the casino-owners to worry about how close is close enough
to be indiscernible by prospective gamblers—carries over to fractals, mutatis mutandis. I
will save space by not spelling this out. In short: what was said there, about the practical
purposes of a casino in making a wheel fair enough that a gambler cannot profit from
assiduously observing its long-run statistics, carries over here to the practical purposes of
a film studio in making a simulated image look fractal at spatial scales so small that even
the most hawk-eyed cinema-goer cannot see that it is in fact not fractal.
But there are two other topics worth pausing over. One is obvious from the mention of
computer graphics: the use of fractals to model naturally occurring objects like mountains,
rocks, trees and leaves. This merits a separate discussion; cf. Section 5.3.
The other topic is an analogue for fractals of the quantifier-shift that Section 4.2.1
discussed as underlying the “two sides of the coin” in (1:Deduce). (This topic is also
connected to the robustness requirement in my notion of emergence; but I will not pursue
this.)
Thus take a traditional geometrical variable magnitude: in philosophers’ jargon, a
determinable property of a geometrical figure F . For example, consider ‘contains a con-
tinuous arc of length greater than L’ (variable L). And suppose we have an repeatable
definitional process, that at its Mth iteration defines a figure (subset of IRn), FM , and
that introduces successively finer structure so that for each value L of the variable, FM
lacks the property for sufficiently large M . That is: the property is lost after sufficiently
many iterations. Or to put it more positively: an approximate or coarse-grained version
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of a fractal-like property is gained. For example, the definitional process might imply:
∀L > 0,∃N, ∀M > N : the figure FM lacks arcs of length greater than L. But for smaller
L, more iterations will be needed.
To make an analogy with Section 4.2.1’s quantifier-shift, we now develop this idea so
as to both:
(a) use an ‘resolution’ ε, as is usual in definitions of convergence;
(b) make a “pointwise vs. uniform” contrast, by quantifying over some set G of
geometrical properties, or sub-figures, of the figure FM .
Thus suppose that in the figure FM at stage M , the only, or the largest, example of a
property or sub-figureG ∈ G is of size (say, length) L. I will write this as: Size(FM , G) = ε.
Then the successive loss of properties G ∈ G—more exactly: the loss of visible, large-
enough-to-be-seen, G ∈ G—by a sequence of figures {FM} can happen: either pointwise
across G, viz.
∀ε, ∀G ∈ G, ∃N ∀M > N : Size(FM , G) < ε;
or uniformly across G, viz.
∀ε, ∃N ∀G ∈ G, ∀M > N : Size(FM , G) < ε.
Besides, there are alternatives to using such a set G so as to make the pointwise/uniform
contrast. We could instead use different parts of the figures FM . Thus one can imagine
the stages of the definitional process to proceed at different “rates” in different regions:
in different thirds, ninths,..., of the Cantor set; or sides, sub-sides, sub-sub-sides,..., of
the Koch snowflake. If the rates vary in a suitably ever-slower way, across a denumerable
sequence of sub-regions, one would get convergence to the fractal structure that is merely
pointwise across the set.
5.2.3 Supervenience is a red herring
I shall be very brief about my third claim, (3:Herring): that although various superve-
nience theses are true, they yield little or no insight into emergence, or more generally, into
“what is going on” in the example. For the situation is again like that for the method of
arbitrary functions (Section 4.2.3): my claim holds true, essentially because supervenience
makes no connection with the main ideas of the example—self-similarity and dimension
as an exponent.
For any finite N , the property of interest, dimension, of the object concerned, i.e. of
a subset X ⊂ IRn, “supervenes on how X is constituted from points”—in at least two
obvious senses of this phrase. Namely: (i) the trivially strong sense in which only X itself
contains those very points (cf. set-theory’s axiom of extensionality); (ii) the marginally
weaker sense in which as regards its constitution from points, X matches any congruent
or scaled copy of X. And since in this example, there are infinite systems σ(∞), i.e. the
“irregular” sets C,K ⊂ IRn etc., the same goes for N = ∞. That is: the dimension of
these sets, in any of the several senses of dimension, thus supervenes.
But such supervenience theses are trivial and useless, for the two now-familiar reasons.
(a): They provide no control on the infinity (infinite disjunction) they are concerned with,
because no kind of limit is taken. (b): Their infinity makes no connection with the limit,
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N →∞, that the example is concerned with. In particular, the supervenience thesis gives
no hint that we can use the idea of dimension as an exponent so as to define non-integral
dimensions.
5.3 The fractal geometry of nature?
So far, the pure mathematics of dimension has dominated the discussion. But fractals have
many empirical applications. As I discussed in Section 5.1.2.A, countless empirical studies
have found power law behaviour with a dimension as a non-integral exponent: recall the
examples of the coastline and electrodeposited copper. And Section 5.2.2 mentioned
computer graphics’ use of fractals to model objects like mountains, trees and leaves. This
representational power of fractals is remarkable, indeed amazing.20 Thus fractals have
been hailed as revealing the true geometry of nature, e.g. by Mandelbrot (1982). But this
claim has been disputed (Shenker 1994, especially Sections 3-5; Smith 1998, pp. 31-38):
hence this Subsection’s title.
I will argue that with my claims (2:Before) and (4:Unreal), we can put this controversy
to rest. I will distinguish two senses of the phrase ‘geometry of nature’, and propose that
fractal geometry is a geometry of nature, in the second sense but not the first. It will be
clear that (2:Before) corresponds to the second sense, while (4:Unreal) corresponds to the
first. Finally, I will introduce an “abstract”, rather than “natural history”, sense of the
phrase. In this last sense, fractal geometry is again a geometry of nature; and this again
corresponds to (2:Before).
Suppose first that ‘geometry of nature’ means ‘the completely accurate description of
the shapes and sizes of macroscopic objects’. Then it sure looks like fractal geometry is
the geometry of nature—as many a film with computer-generated graphics attests. But
authors such as Shenker have objected that a fractal has an infinite sequence of intricate
but similar structure on ever smaller length scales; while a mountain, rock, tree, fern and
leaf do not, thanks to their atomic constitution. This objection is of course correct: recall
my claim (4:Unreal) of Section 2. So despite initial appearances, fractal geometry is not
in this sense the geometry of nature.
Indeed, the objection can be sharpened, in two ways: one theoretical, one practical.
(Neither seems to have been noticed in the literature.) I touched on the theoretical
sharpening, already in footnote 18, when I noted that while Euclidean geometry admits
the similarity of triangles and other figures, on which self-similarity and so fractals depend,
non-Euclidean geometries do not. This means that if physical space is in fact slightly non-
Euclidean on even the tiniest scales, as general relativity and cosmology nowadays say,
then macroscopic objects could not be exactly fractal—even if atomism was false and they
20And noticed by the wider culture: in Stoppard’s play Arcadia (1993), the hero Valentine describes
a stage-by-stage computer-simulation: ‘If you knew the algorithm and fed it back say ten thousand
times, each time there’d be a dot somewhere on the screen. You’d never know where to expect the next
dot. But gradually you’d start to see this shape, because every dot would be inside the shape of this
leaf. It wouldn’t be a leaf, it would be a mathematical object.’ In another passage he is lyrical about
fractals’ representation of other ‘ordinary-sized stuff which is our lives, the things people write poetry
about—clouds, daffodils, waterfalls’.
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were instead composed of continuous matter, even on arbitrarily small length scales. So
here again, we meet my claim (4:Unreal).21
The practical sharpening concerns the details of Section 5.1.2.A’s empirical studies
of power laws with a quantity f proportional to a non-integral power of a resolution δ:
f = constant × δD. Suppose that faced with such a study, we ask: how many orders
of magnitude of δ does the data report—or does the analysis in fact probe? The answer
can be: disappointingly few. A survey of ninety-six Physical Review articles (in the years
1990-1996) reporting fractal analysis of data found that among these articles: (i) the
average spread of resolutions that were probed was 1.3 orders of magnitude; and (ii) at
most three orders of magnitude were probed (Avnir et al. 1998). In terms of measuring
the length of a coastline: an “average paper” in the set surveyed by Avnir et al. would
describe the coastline or its length as ‘fractal’, though the authors considered a spread of
resolutions that went only from some length L to about thirteen times L, ≈ 13L. And
even the papers that were most stringent, or cautious, in describing their phenomenon as
‘fractal’ probed their resolution only up to three orders of magnitude.22
To sum up about this first sense of ‘geometry of nature’: if we ask the question,
Do fractals describe, with complete accuracy, the shapes and sizes of naturally
occurring macroscopic objects?
we have to answer ‘No’.
But despite this answer ‘No’, the representational power of fractals remains very strik-
ing. Power laws with a non-integral exponent describe very many phenomena; and our
understanding of the phenomenon is often enhanced, empirically as well as theoretically,
by adding to the bare power law, the suggestive language and exact theorems of fractal
geometry. Here again we see that in a suitably weak sense, emergence can occur before
the relevant limit: (2:Before) again!
Besides, this is consistent with (4:Unreal), since (2:Before) applies to values of the
parameter N which are typically much smaller than those making true (4:Unreal). That
is: our ‘No’ answer turned upon our question’s requiring complete accuracy. If instead we
ask, in the context of modelling some specific phenomenon involving naturally occurring
macroscopic objects, ‘Do fractals describe, with sufficient accuracy, the shapes and sizes
of these objects?’, our answer would very often be ‘Yes’. In this weaker sense, fractal
geometry undoubtedly is a geometry of nature.
There is another aspect to this resolution of the controversy; (which, like the foregoing,
should not be controversial!). So far I have considered the shapes and sizes of macroscopic
21I stress the phrases ‘nowadays say’ and ‘macroscopic objects’. I of course agree that, for all we know,
fractals may be involved as fundamental structures in the ultimate theory, at present unknown, of matter
and-or space. But that is not our concern.
22Thanks to Leo Kadanoff for commenting that, happily, the range probed can also be much larger.
He mentions the work of Libchaber and co-authors on turbulence, and Nagel and co-authors on glassy
behaviour. Indeed, the former have probed five orders of magnitude (e.g. Castaing et al. 1989), and the
latter have probed thirteen (Dixon et al. 1990). I presume that the latter group’s Physical Review papers
have been omitted from Avnir et al’s survey for the ironic reason that they meritoriously avoid using the
word ‘fractal’.
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objects in physical space. But suppose we allow that ‘geometry’ applies to objects or
structures in other spaces: in physical theories’ state-spaces, which indeed often include
objects and structures the theory calls ‘geometric’. Some of these theories are strikingly
successful, in the depth and accuracy of their theoretical descriptions and observational
predictions. So some of these postulated geometric descriptions surely deserve to be called
(a) ‘geometry of nature’: i.e. a geometry of an object or structure in a physically real
space, albeit a more abstract (and often less visualizable) space than physical space. So
if we ask instead a third question,
Do some of our successful physical theories use fractals to describe certain sub-
sets of their abstract spaces, in particular attributing a non-integer dimension
to such objects?
the answer is again: Yes.
Here are just two examples, out of many one could cite. One can check that in each of
them, the justification for using fractals, i.e. for the N →∞ limit, is the Straightforward
Justification of Section 3.3.3, with its two obvious reasons, mathematical convenience and
empirical success.
(1): In classical mechanics, there are physically important fractal subsets of the phase
spaces of systems. In particular, the famous Lorenz and He´non attractors have fractal
dimension. (The philosophical literature on chaos theory has discussed these, along the
lines of the Straightforward Justification; e.g. Smith’s (1998, pp. 41-43, 50-56) discussion
of the Lorenz attractor.)
(2): Statistical mechanics describes some aspects (viz. critical points) of some processes
(phase transitions, like boiling and freezing) with scale-free (regimes of) theories, which
involve power-law behaviour on all scales and self-similarity, and therefore fractals. Sec-
tion 7 will give more details. In particular, Section 7.2.2 will discuss the phenomenon
of cross-over: in which, as the parameter N grows, the system’s behaviour crosses over
from illustrating (2:Before), at intermediate values of N , to illustrating (4:Unreal), at
larger values of N , to again illustrating (2:Before) at yet larger values of N . Thus cross-
over will be a vivid illustration of my swings-and-roundabouts, (2:Before)-and-(4:Unreal),
Yes-and-No, answer to the question ‘Is fractal geometry the geometry of nature?’
5.4 The story so far: summing up fractals
Let me sum up the fractals example as a list of six morals. It will be obvious, without
making explicit my four claims, or Section 3.3.3’s Straightforward Justification, or the
parallels with the method of arbitrary functions, that this list also sums up the whole
story so far.
(i): The large finite is often well-modelled by the infinite.
(ii): Such models are often justified in a straightforward, even obvious, way, by math-
ematical convenience and empirical success.
(iii): The infinite often brings new mathematical structure: in the fractals example,
non-integer dimension.
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(iv): Nevertheless, there is often a reduction: the emergent non-integer dimensions are
reducible to a sufficiently rich theory that takes the infinite limit.
(v): On the other hand, one can often see emergent behaviour on the way to the limit.
Thus in the fractals example: the larger i.e. worse the spatial resolution—the worse your
eyesight—the sooner in the iterative definitional process you see (more precisely: think
you see!) the fractal structure.
(vi): Various supervenience theses hold—but they are trivial, or at least scientifically
useless.
6 Superselection
6.1 Introduction
I turn to the first of my two examples from physics proper: superselection in the N →∞
limit of quantum mechanics. As in the previous two examples, I will first expound the
technical details without reference to my claims (Section 6.2), and then illustrate the
claims (Section 6.3). But to make those illustrations richer, I will give more details
than previously. So the aim of this Subsection is to describe the lie of the land—and so
indicate which details matter more. I will do this by describing (i) the general topic of
the quantum-classical transition (Section 6.1.1) and (ii) the basic idea of superselection
in the limit (Section 6.1.2).
6.1.1 Out of the quantum soup
This example is an aspect of a much larger topic: the emergence of the classical world
from the quantum world. This is often discussed in terms of a limit h¯→ 0. But the topic
involves a lot else, such as proposals for the importance of specific states (e.g. coherent
states), and-or of specific physical processes (e.g. decoherence). My example is just one
case of the general idea that classical physics should emerge for “large” quantum systems:
so in this example of my theme that N →∞, N will be the number of degrees of freedom.
(We will see how this N →∞ relates to h¯→ 0. But as I announced at the end of Section
2, I will not in this Section pursue my fourth claim (4:Unreal).)
By way of glimpsing the larger topic, I note that there are now many well-understood
examples of classical physics emerging for large (i.e. N →∞) quantum systems. Much of
this work uses the algebraic approach to quantum theory, in which systems are primarily
described by algebras of quantities, on which the states are linear expectation function-
als; and I shall follow suit. For example, Sewell’s recent monograph uses this approach to
articulate a ‘rather general scheme for ... deriving the irreversible deterministic macro-
scopic dynamical laws of many-particle systems, such as those of hydrodynamics or heat
conduction, from their underlying quantum dynamics’ (2002, p. 87). This scheme forms
a girder across the rest of Sewell’s book: it is realised in detail, in several examples.23
23The first is a toy-model reminiscent of quantum Brownian motion: a massive particle at one end of
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To illustrate my claims, I can treat superselection more simply than by following
Sewell’s scheme: the main simplification will lie in ignoring dynamics (especially, the
deduction of classical equations of motion) and aiming only to deduce, as N → ∞,
classical kinematics (more precisely, commutativity of quantities). But to give a general
perspective, it is worth first quoting Sewell’s scheme. (These details are not needed later.)
Sewell’s macroscopic picture is given by a classical dynamical system M = (Y , T )
where Y is a topological space, and {T (t) | t ∈ IR+} is a one-parameter semigroup of
transformations of Y . M is to correspond to the dynamics of a one-parameter family YΩ
of finite sets of quantities of a quantum system Σ; where Σ’s evolution will be given by
a one-parameter group α(IR) of automorphisms of Σ’s algebra of quantities. So we write
YΩ = {Y (1)Ω , ..., Y (k)Ω }.
Here Ω is a “large”, dimensionless, positive parameter whose magnitude provides a
measure of the quantities’ macroscopicality. We then require that there is a set ∆ of
states of Σ such that:
(a): For each state φ ∈ ∆, the means and dispersions of YΩ converge to limits,
Y (φ) ≡ Y and 0, respectively, as Ω→∞.
(b): As φ runs through ∆, the resultant range of the limiting values Y ≡ Y (φ) is
just the classical phase space Y . (So Y is a subset of IRk.)
(c) The classical dynamical semigroup T (IR+) ofM is induced by the evolution of Σ
from states in ∆, on a “macroscopic” time scale Ωγ, with γ > 0. To be precise: we require
that the mean and dispersion, for a state φ ∈ ∆, of the k macroscopically time-evolved
quantities α(Ωγt)YΩ should converge to T (t)Y and 0, respectively, as Ω→∞.
Accordingly, Section 6.2 will give analogues of Sewell’s kinematic (a) and (b), though
not of his dynamical (c). But in two other respects, I will go beyond the above scheme.
First, I will emphasise that there are two different infinite limits to be considered:
(i) the classical limit of ever-larger (increasing N) quantum systems, which will have
all quantities commuting, and which corresponds to Sewell’s (a) and (b); and
(ii) the quantum limit of ever-larger quantum systems, which will exhibit superselec-
tion, i.e. some quantities apart from multiples of the identity operator commuting with
all quantities: in algebraic terms, the centre of the algebra of quantities being non-trivial.
Second, I will discuss these limits in terms of deformation quantization: which has the
merits not only of generality and precision, but also of showing how (both of) these limits
are continuous—pace the frequent emphasis on the singularity of h¯ → 0, and philoso-
phers’ frequent emphasis on discontinuous limits as a signature of emergence. (Recall
the discussions in Sections 1.1 and 3.3.) In both these respects, my treatment follows
(but simplifies) some material in Landsman’s masterly account of the quantum-classical
transition (2006).
a semi-infinite chain of much lighter particles, with harmonic nearest-neighbour interactions; p. 94-106.
His Chapters 7, 10 and 11 describe much more advanced cases, e.g. lasers.
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6.1.2 The idea of superselection in the limit
Setting aside all details of both mathematics and physics, I will state in a nutshell the
idea of superselection emerging in the limit N →∞, by using the idea that a sequence of
numbers, each less than one, has in general an infinite product equal to zero. Thinking
of each number as an inner product of two vectors allows us to think of this zero as
orthogonality: a hallmark of superselection.
Imagine that we assign two real vectors ∈ IR3, each of unit-length, with angle θ between
them, the “score” cos θ. So if they are parallel, the score is cos 0 = 1; but if they are not
parallel, it is less than 1. And suppose we assign two sequences of unit vectors, each with
N members, a score that is the product of the cosines of the angles between corresponding
members:
score(< v1, v2, ..., vN > , < u1, u2, ..., uN >) := (6.1)
cos θv1u1 cos θv2u2 ... cos θvNuN
We now let N tend to infinity, and consider the limiting values of the score we have
defined. We note two sorts of case:—
(1): A pair of infinite sequences < vi >,< ui > in which the vectors at corresponding
positions i are not parallel, only for finitely many i. Then only finitely many factors in
the score will be different from 1; infinitely many factors will be 1. So the total infinite
product of numbers is a product of finitely many cosines each less than 1. This is some
real number of modulus less than 1. It might be zero: namely if at least one pair of vector
vi, ui are perpendicular.
(2): A pair of infinite sequences < vi >,< ui > in which the vectors at corresponding
i are not parallel, for infinitely many i. So the total infinite product of numbers is a
product including infinitely many numbers that are each less than 1. In general, this
infinite product is zero (and even if there are also infinitely many factors each equal to
1).
These elementary considerations underly the emergence of superselection in the N →
∞ limit of quantum mechanics. (1) corresponds to two quantum states (two infinite
sequences of unit-vectors) being in the same superselection sector. And (2) corresponds
to two quantum states being in different superselection sectors.
Now I enter in to details. As in my previous two examples, I first expound the
technicalities without reference to my claims (Section 6.2), and then illustrate the claims
(Section 6.3).
6.2 Superselection in the N →∞ limit of quantum mechanics
In Section 6.2.1, I describe our prototype systems: finite and infinite spin chains. This will
already exhibit the idea just expounded, of a “score” of sequences of vectors that converges
to zero. In Section 6.2.2, I introduce the ideas of deformation quantization (especially
continuous fields of algebras of quantities), in terms of which our N → ∞ limits will be
continuous. In Section 6.2.3, I treat the classical infinite-N limit of quantum systems:
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for spin chains, this means identifying macroscopic quantities with averages of quantum
observables, with the average being taken over greater and greater segments of the chain.
In Section 6.2.4, I treat the quantum infinite-N limit: here the limiting quantities are
local in the sense that they “ignore” all but a finite part of the system. In Section 6.2.5,
I discuss classical states of the quantum-infinite, and thus connect with superselection.
NB: Each Section begins with a brief statement and then, after the announcement ‘In
Detail’, gives details—which the reader in a hurry can skip.
For all this material, and much more, I recommend Landsman (2006, especially Sec-
tions 4.3, 6.1-6.4), who also gives many references (and whose notation I adopt). Com-
pared with Landsman, I have chosen to down-play infinite tensor products and the repre-
sentation of algebras, and to emphasise deformation quantization. This avoids repeating
material which is well-known in the philosophy of physics literature; and more important,
gives what we need for Section 6.3’s illustrations of my claims.
6.2.1 Spin chains
I begin with three claims about spin chains, which serve as ideal infinite models of ferro-
magnets. I shall take a doubly infinite spin-half chain, with sites labelled by the integers
Z. But it will be clear that similar claims would hold for higher spin, and for a one-
dimensional half-infinite chain (sites labelled byN) or for a two- or three-dimensional spin
lattice (Z2 or Z3). In these claims, we eschew infinite tensor products and non-separable
Hilbert spaces. Rather we define a continuous family of separable Hilbert spaces, each of
which will later turn out to be a superselection sector.
The overall physical idea is that:
(a) The vacuum i.e. ground state has all the spins aligned in one spatial direction,
with other (higher-energy) states built up by flipping a finite number of spins from the
preferred direction (and superposing); yielding a separable Hilbert space representing the
spin-algebra.
(b) But nature does not prefer one such direction. So for any direction, there is a
vacuum state with the spins thus aligned; and the higher-energy states built up from this
vacuum yield an associated Hilbert space.
(c) These Hilbert space representations differ in a global/macroscopic quantity
(spin density).
(d) The representations are thereby unitarily inequivalent—even though intuitively,
a global rotation (an element of SO(3)) of course rotates one vacuum to another.
In Detail: One shows four claims, e.g. for the one-dimensional doubly infinite spin
chain; (cf. e.g. Sewell 1986: 16-18, or 2002: 15-18).
(a): For each direction (where positive and negative z-directions count as two
directions), there is an irreducible representation of the infinite spin algebra generated
by denumerably many pairwise-commuting copies of the trio of the Pauli matrices, i.e.
generated by matrices: {σn := (σn,x, σn,y, σn,z) | n = 0,±1,±2, . . .}.
Let S be the set of doubly infinite (+1,−1)-sequences, s = (sn)n∈Z , sn = ±1. We
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think of this as the set of “classical” configurations of the eigenvalues ±1 of σz at each
site. Let S(+) ⊂ S be those configurations s with all but finitely many sn = +1. We think
of these as local modifications of the z-up (classical) vacuum s(+) = (.., 1, ...). Let H(+)
be the square-summable functions on S(+):
H(+) := {φ : S(+) → C | Σs∈S(+)|φ(s)|2 <∞} , (6.2)
with inner product
〈φ, ψ〉(+) := Σs∈S(+)φ(s)ψ(s) . (6.3)
The vectors φ(+)s , s ∈ S(+) defined by φ(+)s (s′) = δs,s′ , s, s′ ∈ S(+), are in one-one corre-
spondence with the configurations s. They form an orthonormal basis of H(+).
We can now define operators whose action on the basis vectors φ(+)s is the analogue
of the action of the three Pauli matrices on a single spin. That is, we define {σ(+)n,u | n ∈
Z, u = x, y, z} on H(+) in the obvious way, so as to build a representation on H(+) of the
abstract spin-algebra:
[σn,x, σn,y] = 2iσn,z etc. ; [σm,x, σn,y] = 0 for m 6= n etc. (6.4)
The representation is irreducible since we can pass from any basis vector φ(+)s to any other
φ
(+)
s′ by a sequence of operators σ
(+)
n,u .
Note that because we fixed on the denumerable S(+) ⊂ S, not the continuously
large S, we got a separable Hilbert space H(+). So this representation does not requires
us to make sense of a denumerable tensor product (of copies of |C2).
(b): We can “play the same game”, starting with z-down. That is: let S(−) ⊂ S be
those configurations s with all but finitely many sn = −1. We think of these as local
modifications of the z-down (classical) vacuum. We get a representation on H(−).
Of course, the choice of z was arbitrary. So we can build a representation for any
direction. And each such representation: (a) takes the ground state to have all spins
aligned along the direction; and (b) builds elements of the representation as all linear
combinations of product states obtained from the ground state by a finite number of
unitary transformations (spin-flips or rotations) at individual sites.
(c): For each such representation, every state in it (indeed every density matrix on it)
has a common value of a global quantity, (aka: classical or macroscopic quantity): namely,
the (vector) spin density defined as the limit as N →∞ of the average of the spin matrices
at the sites −N,−N + 1, . . . , N − 1, N , i.e. limN→∞ 12N+1Σ+Nn=−Nσn.
In more detail: On our first space H(+), define
m
(+)
N :=
1
2N + 1
Σ+Nn=−Nσ
(+)
n ; (6.5)
so that the expectation value on basis states is
〈φ(+)s ,m(+)N φ(+)s 〉 =
(
0, 0,
1
2N + 1
Σ+Nn=−Nsn
)
. (6.6)
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Since all but a finite number of sn are +1, 6.6 implies, with k the unit vector along 0z:
lim
N→∞
〈φ(+)s ,m(+)N φ(+)s 〉 = k ,∀s ∈ S(+) . (6.7)
Similarly, one has:
lim
N→∞
〈φ(+)s ,m(+)N φ(+)s′ 〉 = 0 , for s 6= s′ : (6.8)
for in the z-component, m
(+)
N gives no spin-flip or rotation, so that the orthogonality,
〈φ(+)s , φ(+)s′ 〉 = 0, yields 0; while in the x and y components, the eventual agreement of s
and s′ in having thereafter always the value +1 means thatm(+)N ’s spin-flips and rotations
give inner product zero at those sites, while the increasing 2N + 1 denominator kills any
initial non-zero contribution got from m
(+)
N ’s action. Thus from 6.6 and 6.8, it follows
that for any unit vector Ψ(+) ∈ H(+),
lim
N→∞
〈Ψ(+),m(+)N Ψ(+)〉 = k . (6.9)
So this limiting spin density is a global property of the representation. And the represen-
tations built from other vacua will have different unit vectors in IR3 as their limiting spin
densities.
As we will discuss in more detail: these are the system’s superselection sectors. There
are continuously many sectors, each of denumerable dimension.
(d): Each such representation is unitarily inequivalent to every other. For example: if
the representations on H(+) and H(−) were unitarily equivalent, there would be a unitary
U : H(+) → H(−) with Uσ(+)n U−1 = σ(−)n . This would imply that Um(+)N U−1 =m(−)N . This
in turn would imply that, for any unit vectors Ψ(±) ∈ H(±) with Ψ(+) = U−1Ψ(−)
〈Ψ(+),m(+)N Ψ(+)〉 = 〈Ψ(−),m(−)N Ψ(−)〉 : (6.10)
but this must be false, since the two sides have different limits, viz. ±k, as N →∞.
6.2.2 Continuous fields of algebras and deformation quantization
The main idea we need from the modern theory of deformation quantization (in the
C∗-algebraic approach) is the idea of a continuous field of algebras of quantities. For
Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 will define such fields in such a way that their N → ∞ limits
are continuous. But when I enter details, I will also define two other central ideas of the
theory.
The idea is that a continuous field of algebras of quantities is like a bundle in differential
geometry. The base space is a set I 3 h¯ of real numbers, and the fibre above each point
h¯ ∈ I is a C∗-algebra Ah¯ representing the system’s quantities for that value of h¯. (Of
course, this is not meant to suggest that the value of h¯ really varies. As usual, this is
shorthand, essentially for the ratio of h¯ to the typical values of the system’s, or problem’s,
actions.) The topology of the bundle is defined indirectly by specifying what are its
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continuous sections. As we will see: the value h¯ = 0 can correspond to a N → ∞ limit;
and we can choose the algebras (and the definitions of continuous sections) so as to make
this either a classical limit or a quantum limit.
More formally: a continuous field of C∗-algebras over I 3 h¯ consists of a C∗-algebra A,
and a collection of C∗-algebras {Ah¯}h¯∈I , subject to certain conditions which imply that:
(i): the family (Ah¯)h¯∈I of C∗-algebras is glued together by specifying the space of
continuous sections of the bundle
∐
h¯∈I Ah¯ (where
∐
indicates disjoint union);
(ii): the C∗-algebra A can be identified with this space of sections.
In Detail: A continuous field of C∗-algebras over I 3 h¯ consists of a C∗-algebra A, a
collection of C∗-algebras {Ah¯}h¯∈I , and a surjective morphism ϕh¯ : A → Ah¯ for each h¯ ∈ I
such that:
(i): the function h¯ 7→ ‖ϕh¯(A)‖h¯ is in C0(I) for all A ∈ A;24
(ii): the norm of any A ∈ A is ‖A‖ = suph¯∈I ‖ϕh¯(A)‖;
(iii): for any f ∈ C0(I) and A ∈ A there is an element fA ∈ A for which ϕh¯(fA) =
f(h¯)ϕh¯(A) for all h¯ ∈ I.
The idea is that the C∗-algebras (Ah¯)h¯∈I are glued together by a topology on the disjoint
union
∐
h¯∈[0,1]Ah¯. But this topology is defined indirectly, by specifying the space of
continuous sections of the “bundle”. Namely, a continuous section of the field is defined
to be a map h¯ 7→ Ah¯ where Ah¯ ∈ Ah¯ for which there is an A ∈ A such that Ah¯ = ϕh¯(A)
for all h¯ ∈ I. So the C∗-algebra A may actually be identified with the space of continuous
sections of the field: if we do so, the morphism ϕh¯ is just the evaluation map at h¯.
With this idea of a continuous field of algebras, we can define a deformation quantiza-
tion. We begin with a classical phase spaceM , on which the continuous complex functions
f represent quantities (through their real and imaginary parts). We want to define, for
each value of h¯, a quantization map Qh¯ mapping such functions f to elements of Ah¯, sub-
ject to various conditions—in particular, the “Dirac” condition that the Poisson bracket
on M is mapped to the quantum mechanical commutator (times i
h¯
). Two technical com-
ments: (i) M can be a Poisson manifold—a mild generalization of the usual symplectic
manifold; (ii) on the other hand, we take f to be smooth with compact support—the
space C∞c (M) of these functions is a norm-dense sub-algebra of C0(M).
Thus we define: a deformation quantization of a phase space M is a continuous field
of C∗-algebras (Ah¯)h¯∈[0,1] (with A0 = C0(M)), along with a family of linear maps Qh¯ :
C∞c (M)→ Ah¯, h¯ ∈ (0, 1], that are self-adjoint (i.e. Qh¯(f) = Qh¯(f)∗), and such that:
(i) for each f ∈ C∞c (M) the map defined by 0 7→ f and h¯ 7→ Qh¯(f) (h¯ 6= 0) is a
continuous section of the given continuous field of algebras;
(ii) for all f, g ∈ C∞c (M) one has the “Dirac” condition
lim
h¯→0
∥∥∥∥ ih¯ [Qh¯(f),Qh¯(g)]−Qh¯({f, g})
∥∥∥∥
h¯
= 0. (6.11)
24Here ‖ ‖h¯ is the norm in Ah¯, and C0(I) is the continuous complex functions on I that vanish at
infinity in the usual sense that for any ε > 0, there is a compact set beyond which the function is less
than ε. For any locally compact Hausdorff space X, C0(X) is a C∗-algebra when equipped with the
supremum norm, ‖f‖∞ := supx∈X |f(x)|. In any case, for our examples I is itself compact.
48
This definition turns out to imply other natural “meshing” conditions, such as:
lim
h¯→0
‖Qh¯(f)Qh¯(g)−Qh¯(fg)‖h¯ = 0 ; limh¯→0 ‖Qh¯(f)‖h¯ = ‖f‖∞ (6.12)
where ‖f‖∞ is the supremum norm supz∈M |f(z)| on A0 = C0(M).
By way of indicating the power of deformation quantization, let me sketch how a
definition which it enables, viz. of a continuous field of states (treated as linear functionals
on quantities), gives a natural generalization of the notion of coherent states—which are
the focus of many discussions of the h¯ → 0 limit of quantum mechanics. (The details of
Sections 6.2.5 and 6.3.1 will also need this definition.)
Given a state ωh¯ on Ah¯ for each h¯ ∈ [0, 1]: we define the family of states to be a
continuous field (relative to a given deformation quantization), whenever the function
h¯ 7→ ωh¯(Qh¯(f)) is continuous on [0, 1] for each f ∈ C∞c (M). (In fact, this notion is
intrinsically defined by the continuous field of C∗-algebras, and is therefore independent
of the quantization maps Qh¯.) In particular, one has
lim
h¯→0
ωh¯(Qh¯(f)) = ω0(f). (6.13)
Now recall the idea of a sequence of coherent states (Ψh¯z )h¯∈[0,1] that tend, as h¯ → 0,
to be ever more peaked about the classical phase space state z ∈M , so that in the limit,
the quantum expectation value tends to the value of the classical quantity at the state z:
lim
h¯→0
(Ψh¯z ,Qh¯(f)Ψh¯z ) = f(z). (6.14)
(This of course exemplifies (a) and (b) in Sewell’s scheme, reported in Section 6.1.1: the
coherent states are Sewell’s set ∆ of quantum states, h¯ is the reciprocal of his Ω, and
M is his phase space Y .) Clearly, eq. 6.13 generalizes eq. 6.14. Indeed, one can show
that coherent states are examples of continuous fields of (pure) states; (for details, cf.
Landsman (2006, Section 4.2, 5.1).
6.2.3 The classical infinite: macroscopic quantities from symmetric sequences
I turn to the classical N →∞ limit of N copies of a quantum system that has an algebra
of quantities A1. The idea is to identify a classical, macroscopic quantity with a limiting
average of a microscopic quantum quantity. Thus the microscopic quantity is defined
over say M copies of the system; (so it is often called an “M -particle observable”). But
this quantity is averaged over N copies (N > M), and then we take the limit N → ∞.
For spin chains (Section 6.2.1), this means the average is taken over greater and greater
segments of the chain.
This is made precise in terms of a continuous field of C∗-algebras A(c) over different
values of N . The four main points are:—
(i): To conform to Section 6.2.2’s notation for h¯→ 0, we in fact use the reciprocal of
N , 1/N , rather than N . Thus A(c)1/N will be the usual algebra of quantities for N copies of
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the basic quantum system, viz. ⊗ˆNA1, i.e. the N -fold tensor power of the basic algebra
A1.
(ii): We associate a macroscopic quantity with a sequence A = (A1, A2, · · ·) of algebra-
elements, with AN ∈ ⊗ˆNA1 =: AN1 , that is symmetric in the sense that its tail consists
of some finite-particle quantity averaged over an ever-larger number of systems or sites.
That is: a sequence is symmetric if each of its elements AP for all P greater than some
fixed N consists of some quantity on M (with M < N) copies of the system (an “M -
particle observable”) averaged over P copies.
(iii): In the limit N →∞, symmetric sequences commute; and this will mean that the
macroscopic quantities form a commutative C∗-algebra. In fact this algebra is isomorphic
to C(S(A1)), i.e. the continuous complex functions on the quantum state-space for (the
density matrices on) the basic algebra A1.
(iv): The important features (both here and in subsequent Sections) are present in
the construction for the simplest basic algebra A1 :=M2(|C), i.e. a spin chain with a spin-
half system at each site. So we can throughout the discussion keep this system in mind.
For example, S(M2(|C)) is the Bloch sphere B3 in R3, with pure states on the boundary
∂B3 = S2. So according to (iii), the macroscopic quantities for a chain of spin-halves are
given by the continuous complex functions on the Bloch sphere.
In Detail: From A1 = say M2(|C), we will construct a continuous field of C∗-algebras
A(c) over the discrete set
I = 0 ∪ 1/N = {0, . . . , 1/N, . . . , 13 , 12 , 1} ⊂ [0, 1], (6.15)
by putting
A(c)0 := C(S(A1)); (6.16)
A(c)1/N := AN1 := ⊗ˆ
NA1. (6.17)
Thus if A1 = M2(|C), then S(M2(|C)) is the Bloch sphere B3 in R3, and A(c)0 is the set of
continuous functions on B3.
To define symmetric sequences, we first say that the symmetrization operator SN :
AN1 → AN1 is given by (linear and continuous) extension of
SN(B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗BN) := 1
N !
∑
σ∈SN
Bσ(1) ⊗ · · · ⊗Bσ(N), (6.18)
where SN is the permutation group on N elements and Bi ∈ A1 for all i = 1, . . . , N . Then
we define Symmetrization maps jNM : AM1 → AN1 by
jNM(AM) = SN(AM ⊗ 1⊗ · · · ⊗ 1); (6.19)
with N−M copies of 1 ∈ A1 so as to get an element of AN1 . For example, jN1 : A1 → AN1
is given by
jN1(B) = B
(N)
=
1
N
N∑
k=1
1⊗ · · · ⊗B(k) ⊗ 1 · · · ⊗ 1, (6.20)
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where B(k) is B as an element of the k’th copy of A1 within AN1 . As B(N) indicates, this is
the ‘average’ of B over all copies of A1. More generally, in forming jNM(AM) an operator
AM ∈ AM1 that involvesM sites is averaged over N ≥M sites. When N →∞ this means
that one forms a macroscopic average of an M -particle operator.
A sequence A = (A1, A2, · · ·) of algebra elements with AN ∈ AN1 is symmetric when
AN = jNM(AM) (6.21)
for some fixedM and allN ≥M . So the tail of a symmetric sequence consists of ‘averaged’
quantities, which become macroscopic in the limit N →∞. The important point is that
symmetric sequences commute in this limit; more precisely
lim
N→∞
‖ANA′N − A′NAN‖ = 0. (6.22)
The averaging of 1-particle spin operators provides a clear example, and illustrates how
N → ∞ corresponds to h¯ → 0. Thus let AN := jN1(B) and A′N := jN1(C) with
B,C ∈ A1. Then the fact that [B(k), C(l)] = 0 for k 6= l implies that[
B
(N)
, C
(N)
]
=
1
N
[B,C]
(N)
. (6.23)
For example, if A1 = M2(|C) and if for B and C one takes the spin- 12 operators Sj = h¯2σj
for j = 1, 2, 3 (σj the Pauli matrices), then[
S
(N)
j , S
(N)
k
]
= i
h¯
N
²jklS
(N)
l . (6.24)
Thus we get commutation relations formally like those of the one-particle operators, except
that Planck’s constant h¯ is replaced by h¯/N .
We are now ready to define our continuous field of algebras. A section of the field with
fibers 6.17 is a sequence A = (A0, A1, A2, · · ·), with A0 ∈ A(c)0 and AN ∈ AN1 . We say that
a sequence A defines a continuous section of the field iff:
• (A1, A2, · · ·) is approximately symmetric; i.e. for any ε > 0 there is an Nε and a
symmetric sequence A′ such that ‖AN − A′N‖ < ε for all N ≥ Nε;
• A0(ω) = limN→∞ ωN(AN), where ω ∈ S(A1) and ωN ∈ S(AN1 ) is the tensor product
of N copies of ω, i.e.
ωN(B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗BN) = ω(B1) · · ·ω(BN). (6.25)
This choice of continuous sections defines a continuous field of C∗-algebras over I = 0∪1/N
with fibers 6.17. In fact it follows that
lim
N→∞
‖AN‖ = ‖A0‖ . (6.26)
To sum up: the main point is that, in accordance with 6.22, the macroscopic quan-
tities are organized in the limit N → ∞ in to a commutative C∗-algebra isomorphic to
C(S(A1)).
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6.2.4 The quantum infinite: quasi-local sequences
I now treat the quantum N → ∞ limit of N copies of the algebra A1. The key idea
will be that of a quasilocal sequence (A1, A2, · · ·) of algebra elements, with AN ∈ AN1 . In
constructing the continuous field of C∗-algebras, this notion will play an analogous role
to that played in Section 6.2.3 by symmetric sequences. The idea is that the tail of a
quasilocal sequence becomes arbitrarily close (in norm) to an element AM ⊗1⊗1⊗· · ·, so
that the sequence “ignores, in the limit” all but a finite part of the system. The intuition
behind this restriction is that human limitation means we can observe only a finite part
of the system. In any case, the restriction allows us to make precise the heuristic idea of
the algebra for an infinite quantum system, which we might write heuristically as A∞1 =
say M2(|C)
∞.
Formally, the infinite quantum system is the inductive limit C∗-algebra
∪N∈NAN1 (6.27)
of the family of C∗-algebras (AN1 ). Eq. 6.27 consists of all equivalence classes [A] ≡
A0 of quasilocal sequences A = (A1, A2, · · ·), under the equivalence relation A ∼ B iff
limN→∞ ‖AN−BN‖ = 0. As the notation suggests, each AN1 is contained in ∪N∈NAN1 as a
C∗-subalgebra by identifying AN ∈ AN1 with a quasilocal sequence that after the Nth term
just tensors with the identity, viz. the sequence A = (0, · · · , 0, AN , AN⊗1, AN⊗1⊗1, · · ·),
and forming its equivalence class [A] ≡ A0 in ∪N∈NAN1 .
In Detail: A sequence A = (A1, A2, · · ·) (AN ∈ AN1 ) is local if for some fixed M and
all N ≥ M : AN = AM ⊗ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ 1 (with N − M copies of the unit 1 ∈ A1). A
sequence is quasilocal when for any ε > 0 there is an Nε and a local sequence A
′ such that
‖AN − A′N‖ < ε for all N ≥ Nε.
We now define the inductive limit C∗-algebra
∪N∈NAN1 (6.28)
of the family of C∗-algebras (AN1 ) with respect to the inclusion maps AN1 ↪→ AN+11 given
by AN 7→ AN ⊗ 1. As a set, 6.28 consists of all equivalence classes [A] ≡ A0 of quasilocal
sequences A under the equivalence relation A ∼ B when limN→∞ ‖AN − BN‖ = 0. The
norm on ∪N∈NAN1 is
‖A0‖ = lim
N→∞
‖AN‖, (6.29)
and other C∗-algebraic structure is inherited from the quasilocal sequences in the ob-
vious way (e.g., A∗0 = [A
∗] with A∗ = (A∗1, A
∗
2, · · ·), etc.). Thus each AN1 is contained
in ∪N∈NAN1 as a C∗-subalgebra by identifying AN ∈ AN1 with the local sequence A =
(0, · · · , 0, AN , AN ⊗ 1, AN ⊗ 1⊗ 1, · · ·), and forming its equivalence class A0 in ∪N∈NAN1 .
So we define a second continuous field of C∗-algebras A(q) over 0 ∪ 1/N , with fibers
A(q)0 = ∪N∈NAN1 ; (6.30)
A(q)1/N = AN1 . (6.31)
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by declaring that the continuous sections are of the form (A0, A1, A2, · · ·) where (A1, A2, · · ·)
is quasilocal and A0 is defined to be the equivalence class of this quasilocal sequence, as
just explained.
For N <∞ this field has the same fibers
A(q)1/N = A(c)1/N = AN1 (6.32)
as Section 6.2.3’s continuous field A(c) , but the fiber A(q)0 is completely different from
A(c)0 . For if A1 is noncommutative then so is A(q)0 , since it contains all AN1 .
6.2.5 Comparing the classical and quantum limits: classical states and the
de Finetti theorem
One natural way to study the relations between the fields A(c) and A(q) is to consider
those families of abstract states (ω1, ω1/2, · · · , ω1/N , · · ·) (ω1/N is a state on AN1 ) that have
appropriate limit states on both A(c) and A(q). (Here ‘appropriate’ is made precise in
terms of Section 6.2.2’s notion of a continuous field of states.) In this Section, I introduce
the most important such family, the permutation-invariant states. We will see in Section
6.3.1 how they yield superselection sectors, especially in Section 6.2.1’s prototype system,
spin chains.
Of course, any state ω
(q)
0 on A(q)0 defines a state ω(q)0|1/N on each AN1 by restriction; and
the sequence of these states have the given ω
(q)
0 as their appropriate limit state on A(q)0 . If
this sequence of states also converges with respect to the other continuous field of algebras
A(c), i.e. converges to some state ω(c)0 on A(c)0 , then the given state ω(q)0 is called classical.
We specialize to an important class of classical states, viz. those that are “indifferent
to” the label N of the component systems (e.g. of the sites in the spin chain). Formally,
we say that a state ω
(q)
0 on A(q)0 is permutation-invariant if its restrictions to each of the
AN1 is invariant under the natural action of the symmetric group SN on AN1 .
For our purposes, the important point about these states is that they give a close
quantum analogue of the de Finetti representation theorem. Roughly speaking, this
theorem says that any classical probability measure on an infinite Cartesian power prob-
ability space X∞ := X × X × · · · that is permutation-invariant (under permutations
between copies of the factor space X) is a unique mixture of (i.e. has a unique in-
tegral decomposition in terms of) infinite product probability measures p∞ given by
p∞(Y1×Y2×· · ·) := p(Y1).p(Y2).... (with Yi in the sigma-algebra of the ith copy of X) for
some probability measure p on X. Section 6.3.1 will describe how the quantum analogue
of this theorem gives a precise yet general framework for the emergence of superselection.
In Detail: Consider those families of states (ω1, ω1/2, · · · , ω1/N , · · ·) (where ω1/N is a
state on AN1 ) that have limit states both ω(c)0 on A(c)0 and and ω(q)0 on A(q)0 , such that the
ensuing families (ω
(c)
0 , ω1, ω1/2, · · ·) and (ω(q)0 , ω1, ω1/2, · · ·) are continuous fields of states
on A(c) and on A(q) (in the sense of Section 6.2.2).
Any state ω
(q)
0 on A(q)0 defines a state ω(q)0|1/N on AN1 by restriction, and the en-
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suing field of states on A(q) is clearly continuous. (Conversely, any continuous field
(ω
(q)
0 , ω1, ω1/2, . . . , ω1/N , . . .) of states on A(q) becomes arbitrarily close to a field of the
above type for N large.) But the restrictions ω
(q)
0|1/N of a given state ω
(q)
0 on A(q)0 to AN1
may well not converge to a state ω
(c)
0 on A(c)0 for N →∞. States ω(q)0 on ∪N∈NAN1 whose
restrictions ω
(q)
0|1/N do converge to a state ω
(c)
0 on A(c)0 are called classical.
In other words (cf. the definition of A(c)0 especially eq. 6.25): ω(q)0 is classical when
there exists a probability measure µ0 on S(A1) such that
lim
N→∞
∫
S(A1)
dµ0(ρ) (ρ
N(AN)− ω(q)0|1/N(AN)) = 0 (6.33)
for each approximately symmetric sequence (A1, A2, . . .). In other words: a classical state
ω
(q)
0 with limit state ω
(c)
0 on C(S(A1)) defines a probability measure µ0 on S(A1) by
ω
(c)
0 (f) =
∫
S(A1)
dµ0 f, (6.34)
which describes the probability distribution of the macroscopic quantities in that state.
We now make this more concrete by specializing to an important class of classical
states. We say that a state ω on ∪N∈NAN1 is permutation-invariant when each of its
restrictions to AN1 is invariant under the natural action of SN on AN1 (i.e. σ ∈ SN maps
an elementary tensor AN = B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗BN ∈ AN1 to Bσ(1) ⊗ · · · ⊗Bσ(N), cf. 6.18).
We can now state the quantum analogue of the de Finetti representation theorem: a
permutation-invariant state on A(q)0 = ∪N∈NAN1 is a unique mixture of (i.e. has a unique
integral decomposition in terms of) infinite product states ρ∞, that are defined (with
ρ ∈ S(A1)) by saying that if A0 ∈ A(q)0 is an equivalence class [A1, A2, · · ·], then (cf. 6.25)
ρ∞(A0) = lim
N→∞
ρN(AN) . (6.35)
An equivalent definition is to say that the restriction of ρ∞ to any AN1 ⊂ A(q)0 is given by
⊗Nρ.
In other words, the theorem says: any permutation-invariant state ω
(q)
0 has a unique
decomposition
ω
(q)
0 (A0) =
∫
S(A1)
dµ(ρ) ρ∞(A0), (6.36)
where µ is a probability measure on S(A1) and A0 ∈ A(q)0 . We can also state this in more
geometric language, as follows. The set SS of all permutation-invariant states in S(A(q)0 )
is a compact convex set, and is the (weak∗-closed) convex hull of its (extreme) boundary
∂eSS. So the claim of the theorem is that this boundary consists of the infinite product
states (and so is isomorphic to S(A1) in the obvious way).
To sum up this Section, especially 6.33, 6.34 and 6.36:— If ω
(q)
0 is permutation-
invariant, then it is classical. The associated limit state ω
(c)
0 on A(c)0 is characterized
by the fact that the measure µ0 in 6.34 coincides with the measure µ in 6.36.
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6.3 The claims illustrated by emergent superselection
The material in Section 6.2 gives a precise and powerful framework for understanding the
emergence of superselection in the N → ∞ limit. It will be clearest to first summarize
this (Section 6.3.1; again following Landsman (2006)), and then spell out the illustrations
of my claims (Section 6.3.2 et seq.).
6.3.1 Superselection from permutation-invariant states, in spin chains
I begin with generalities, and then return to spin-chains. In the algebraic approach to
quantum theory, a superselection sector is taken to be an appropriate equivalence class
(under unitary isomorphism) of irreducible representations of the system’s abstract the
algebra of quantities A. The word ‘appropriate’ reflects the fact that most irreducible
representations of a typical C∗-algebra A used in physics are physically irrelevant, and so
need to be excluded; (jargon: one needs a selection criterion). Here, we take the algebra of
quantities to be A(q)0 ; and take an (equivalence class of) irreducible representations of A(q)0
to be a superselection sector iff it corresponds to a permutation-invariant pure state on
A(q)0 . (Here ‘correspond’ is made precise using the GNS theorem, viz. as equivalence to the
GNS-representation of the permutation-invariant state.) With this selection criterion, the
results in Section 6.2, especially at 6.35 onwards, trivially imply that there is a bijective
correspondence between pure states on A1 and superselection sectors of A(q)0 .
The results are vividly illustrated by spin chains. In Section 6.2.1, I did not give details
about how to build the infinite tensor product state space H∞1 , with say H1 = |C2. But as
one would hope, we have: If (ei) is some basis of |C
2, an orthonormal basis of H∞1 consists
of all different infinite strings ei1 ⊗ · · · ein ⊗ · · ·, where ein is ei regarded as a vector in |C2.
(And similarly, when we choose the “building-block” algebra A1 6= |C2.) We denote the
multi-index (i1, . . . , in, . . .) simply by I, and the corresponding basis vector by eI . This
Hilbert space H∞1 carries a natural faithful representation pi of A(q)0 : if A0 ∈ A(q)0 is an
equivalence class [A1, A2, · · ·], then pi(A0)eI = limN→∞ANei, where AN acts on the first
N components of eI and leaves the remainder unchanged.
Now the important point is that although each AN1 acts irreducibly on HN1 , the rep-
resentation pi(A(q)0 ) on H∞1 thus constructed is highly reducible. The reason for this is
that by definition (quasi-) local elements of A(q)0 leave the infinite tail of a vector in H∞1
(almost) unaffected, so that vectors with different tails lie in different superselection sec-
tors. Without the quasi-locality condition on the elements of A(q)0 , no superselection rules
would arise.
For example, in terms of the usual basis
{
↑=
(
1
0
)
, ↓=
(
0
1
)}
of |C2, the vectors
Ψ↑ =↑ ⊗ ↑ · · · ↑ · · · (i.e. an infinite product of ‘up’ vectors) and Ψ↓ =↓ ⊗ ↓ · · · ↓ · · · (i.e.
an infinite product of ‘down’ vectors) lie in different sectors. (Cf. items (a) and (b) in
Section 6.2.1, and (iv) in Section 6.2.3.) The reason why the inner product (Ψ↑, pi(A)Ψ↓)
vanishes for any A ∈ A(q)0 is that for local quantities A one has pi(A) = AM ⊗ 1⊗ · · · 1 · · ·
for some AM ∈ B(HM); the inner product in question therefore involves infinitely many
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factors (↑, 1 ↓) = (↑, ↓) = 0. For quasilocal A the operator pi(A) might have a small
nontrivial tail, but again the inner product vanishes by an approximation argument.
More generally, elementary analysis shows that (Ψu, pi(A)Ψv) = 0 whenever Ψu = ⊗∞u
and Ψv = ⊗∞v for unit vectors u, v ∈ |C2 with u 6= v. The corresponding vector states
ψu and ψv on A(q)0 (i.e. ψu(A) = (Ψu, pi(A)Ψu) etc.) are obviously permutation-invariant
and hence classical. Identifying S(M2(|C)) with B3 ⊂ R3, the corresponding limit state
(ψu)0 on A(c)0 defined by ψu is given by (evaluation at) the point u˜ = (x, y, z) of ∂B3 = S2
(i.e. the two-sphere) for which the corresponding density matrix ρ(u˜) is the projection
operator onto u. (It follows that ψu and ψv are unitarily inequivalent.)
We conclude that each unit vector u ∈ |C2 determines a superselection sector piu, namely
the GNS-representation of the corresponding state ψu, and that each such sector is realized
as a subspace Hu of H∞1 (viz. Hu = pi(A(q)0 )Ψu). Moreover, since a permutation-invariant
state on A(q)0 is pure iff it is of the form ψu, these are all the superselection sectors. Thus
we have the subspace (of H∞1 ) and subrepresentation (of pi)
HS := ⊕u˜∈S2Hu;
piS(A(q)0 ) := ⊕u˜∈S2piu(A(q)0 ), (6.37)
where piu is simply the restriction of pi to Hu ⊂ H∞1 .
In the presence of superselection, there are operators that distinguish different sectors
whilst being a multiple of the unit in each sector; cf. items (c) and (d) of Section 6.2.1.
In the framework developed from Section 6.2.2 onwards, these operators are the macro-
scopic quantities of Section 6.2.3. In fact, one can show for any approximately symmetric
sequence (A1, A2, · · ·) the limit
A = lim
N→∞
piS(AN) (6.38)
exists in the strong operator topology on B(HS). Moreover, let A0 ∈ A(c)0 = C(S(A1))
be the function defined by the given sequence (recall that A0(ω) = limN→∞ ωN(AN), cf.
eq. 6.25). Then the map A0 7→ A defines a faithful representation of A(c)0 on HS, which
we again call piS. A calculation shows that piS(A0)Ψ = A0(u˜)Ψ for Ψ ∈ Hu, or, in other
words,
piS(A0) = ⊕u˜∈S2A0(u˜)1Hu . (6.39)
Thus the piS(A0) are indeed the promised operators.
6.3.2 Emergence in the limit: with reduction—and without
I turn at last to how the example of superselection illustrates my claims. It is clear
from the wealth of details in the preceding Sections that my positive claims, (1:Deduce)
and (2:Before), can be richly illustrated, in terms of both quantities and states. So I
will confine myself to mentioning the obvious illustrations, and referring to the previous
discussions and equations.
As to (1:Deduce): we again have ‘reduction as deduction’ in as strong a sense as
you could demand—provided we take the limit. There are several illustrations, some
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concerning quantities or algebras of them, some concerning states. I begin with two brief
cases, referring back to equations in Subsections of Section 6.2.
An obvious case, which concerns quantities, is that symmetric sequences (AN) of
quantities, AN ∈ AN1 , commute in the limit N → ∞. Recall eq. 6.22 in Section 6.2.3.
Another obvious case, which equally concerns states, is spin density in spin chains, as in
part (c) of Section 6.2.1. Thus recall the limiting behaviour of the average, over 2N + 1
sites, of the spin matrices, i.e. the limiting behaviour of m
(+)
N defined by eq. 6.5. The
discussion from eq. 6.6 to eq. 6.9 deduced that the limiting spin density has the same
value, k, for all states in the representation H(+); and so it is a classical quantity, or
superselection operator.
Here are three more substantial cases of such a deduction, using my mnemonic nota-
tions, Tb and Tt: that is, cases where Tb implies Tt. The first two concern quantities, the
third concerns states. Here, I shall mostly refer back to the summary in Section 6.3.1.
(A): Take as Tb the continuous field of C
∗-algebras A(q), together with its represen-
tation theory: or more modestly, together with that part of its representation theory
that deals with permutation-invariant states. Take as Tt a statement of superselection,
e.g. that A(q)0 acts (highly!) reducibly on the infinite-system state space H∞1 . Then we
have just seen in Section 6.3.1 that Tb implies Tt. For the requirement for sequences of
operators to be quasi-local makes the inner products between states in different sectors
of H∞1 vanish. Compare the discussion leading up to eq. 6.37.
(B): Let Tb be the continuous field of C
∗-algebras A(c), together with piS, the faithful
representation of A(c)0 on HS defined by eq. 6.38. Take Tt to state that there are super-
selection operators (classical quantities) that restrict to the identity on each sector HS.
Then we have just seen at the end of Section 6.3.1 that Tb implies Tt. For compare the
discussion leading up to eq. 6.39: any approximately symmetric sequence (AN) (and so
any continuous section of the field) defines such a classical quantity, viz. piS(A0).
(C): We can focus instead on states. Take Tb to encompass both continuous fields of
C∗-algebras, A(q) and A(c), and to consider families of states on them. Take Tt to be the
theory of classical states, especially permutation-invariant, states ω
(q)
0 ; or more modestly,
to be just the quantum de Finetti representation theorem, eq. 6.36. Then Section 6.2.5
shows that Tb implies Tt.
I turn to the “the other side of the coin” of (1:Deduce): the failure of the reduction
at finite N . For (A) and (B), the point is familiar from elementary quantum theory.
Finite N means there is no algebra A(c)0 or A(q)0 to consider: there are only the algebras
A(c)N ≡ A(q)N := AN1 . But in general, if A1 acts irreducibly on H1, then so does AN1 on HN1 .
So (A) fails. And then Schur’s Lemma—that if an algebra acts irreducibly, its commutant
is trivial —immmediately implies that (B) fails, i.e. there are only trivial superselection
operators.
As to (C), the point is less familiar. But it is again straightforward, especially if
we limit ourselves by choosing Tt to be the quantum de Finetti representation theorem,
not the whole theory of classical states; (of course choosing a weaker Tt adds to the
dialectical force of the point that it is not implied). Here the point is that for finite N ,
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the theorem fails. The reason is essentially the same as for the corresponding failure of
the classical theorem for finite N . In short, finite N corresponds to drawing from an
urn without replacement, rather than with replacement. In the classical case, this means
that a permutation-invariant probability measure is a unique mixture, not of product
measures, but of hypergeometric measures (cf. Diaconis 1977, Diaconis and Freedman
1980, Jeffrey 1988, pp. 240-245). Similar remarks apply in the quantum case: (C) of
Section 6.3.3 will give a few more details.
Finally, I note two respects in which this example’s illustration of (1:Deduce) is similar
to that given by fractals, and dissimilar to that given by the method of arbitrary functions.
I noted these respects at the end of Section 5.2.1. First: the emergent behaviour involves
mathematical structures which are new at the limit (such as unitarily inequivalent rep-
resentations, and so superselection). This is like fractals, where the emergent behaviour
involved non-integer dimension at the limit; but unlike the method of arbitrary functions,
where the emergent behaviour involved, more simply, deducing the limiting behaviour of
functions given at finite N .
The second respect is related to the first. Namely, this example considers an infinite
quantum system: in Section 3.1’s notation, an infinite system σ(∞). Again, this is like
fractals, where the Cantor set, Koch snowflake etc. count as infinite systems; but unlike
the method of arbitrary functions, since, for example, no roulette wheel has infinitely
many arcs.
6.3.3 Emergence before the limit
(2:Before) claims that before the limit, there is emergence in a weaker but still vivid
sense. This claim is illustrated in a manner parallel to my previous examples: the method
of arbitrary functions, and fractals. In short, one just has to interpret (sensibly!) the
example’s formalism describing finite N . And as in those examples, the discussion can
be made vivid by referring to practical purposes. There, I cited the practical purposes
of a casino in making a wheel that is fair enough; and the purposes of a film studio in
making an image look fractal at small enough spatial scales. Similarly here: imagine an
experimental physicist making, or a theoretical physicist describing, a sample or device
comprising N atoms or sites (perhaps for a nanotechnology project), with N large enough
for behaviour characteristic of superselection to occur.
Again, one can pick several illustrations. I shall give three. The first concerns states in
spin chains as in Section 6.2.1; the second concerns symmetrized quantities as in Section
6.2.3; the third returns us to the quantum de Finetti representation theorem, as in Section
6.3.2. All three have the merit (absent from my discussion of my previous examples!) of
being quantitative about the “rate of emergence”: about how large an N is needed for
emergent behaviour.
(A): The discussion in part (c) of Section 6.2.1 concentrated on the limiting behaviour
of the expectation value of m
(+)
N on states in H(+). We deduced (cf. eq. 6.6 to eq. 6.9)
that the limiting value is k, the unit vector in the z-direction. But that discussion can
of course be adapted to entail statements about the situation for finite N . To give one
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example: consider the x or y component of the matrix element of m
(+)
N between two
elements φ(+)s , φ
(+)
s′ of the basis of H(+) that correspond to two doubly infinite (+1,-1)-
sequences, s = (sn)n∈Z and s′ = (s′n)n∈Z , both with all but finitely many elements (sn or
s′n) equal to +1. In part (c) of Section 6.2.1, we argued that these matrix elements tend
to 0 as N →∞. But as to finite N : if we know that sn = s′n for all n with |n| > M , we
can readily calculate how large N needs to be for the 2N + 1 denominator to make the x
or y component of the matrix element have modulus less than any given ε.
(B): The discussion surrounding eq. 6.23 and 6.24 in Section 6.2.1 concentrated on
the limiting behaviour, as N → ∞, of the commutator of averages over N particles of
1-particle spin operators. But as in (A), that discussion of course entails statements about
the situation for finite N . Indeed, eq. 6.23 and 6.24 say explicitly that these commutators
are proportional to 1/N .
(C): Section 6.3.2 reported that the quantum de Finetti representation theorem, eq.
6.36, failed for finite N : a permutation-invariant state on N quantum systems need not
be mixture of product states. But in recent years, various finite-N analogues have been
proven, with the following flavour: any state ofM systems, withM < N , that is obtained
from a permutation-invariant state on N systems, by tracing out (partial tracing over)
N −M systems, can be approximated by a mixture of product states on the M systems
(i.e. states ω⊗M), with an error that goes to zero with the ratio M/N , e.g. an error like
O(M/N); (Koenig and Renner 2005, Renner 2007, Koenig and Mitchison 2007).
Note finally that as with my previous two examples, in these three illustrations of
(2:Before) we again see the Straightforward Justification of Section 3.3.3 in action. I
will not labour the point: I will just quote Landsman’s own statement of the idea of
that Section’s fifth paragraph, as applied to the averaging process used (in Section 6.2.3)
in defining macroscopic quantities. Thus Landsman writes: ‘the limit N → ∞ is valid
whenever averaging over N = 1023 particles is well approximated by averaging over an
arbitrarily larger number N (which, then, one might as well let go to infinity)’ (Landsman
2006, preamble to Section 6; p. 493).
6.3.4 Supervenience is a red herring
As in two previous examples, I shall be brief about my third claim, (3:Herring): that
although various supervenience theses are true, they give little or no insight into the
emergent behaviour, or more generally into “what is going on” in the example. The
reason is as in the previous examples: there is no connection between supervenience’s
idea of a variety of ways to have a higher-level property P (in particular the example’s
emergent property) and the limit processes on which the example turns.
But to save space, I will not formulate any such supervenience theses. I leave it as
an exercise (!) to formulate how a system’s having an emergent property, such as a
specific value for a specific classical quantity, or a superselection operator, supervenes
on the system’s microstate, i.e. on the sequence of states assigned to the algebras AN1
for successively larger N -particle (or site) sub-systems. Suffice it to say here that the
important points will be that:
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(i) the value (indeed, even just the well-definedness) of the quantity or operator, in
the strong sense of (1:Deduce) but not the weak sense of (2:Before), needs one to take the
limit N →∞, in the classical (Section 6.2.3) and-or quantum (Section 6.2.4) version; cf.
the end of Section 6.3.1;
(ii) the idea of supervenience on the microstate makes no connection with taking this
limit.
6.4 Summing up superselection
To emphasise the parallel between this long example and the previous two, let me sum
up with a list of six morals which are parallel to those in Section 5.4. As in that Section,
it would be flogging a dead horse to again make explicit my four claims, or Section 3.3.3’s
Straightforward Justification, or the parallels with previous examples.
(i): The large finite is often well-modelled by the infinite.
(ii): Such models are often justified in a straightforward, even obvious, way, by math-
ematical convenience and empirical success.
(iii): The infinite often brings new mathematical structure: in this example, superse-
lection, and associated notions like unitarily inequivalent representations.
(iv): Nevertheless, there is often a reduction: the emergent superselection properties,
and the associated behaviour, are reducible to a sufficiently rich theory that takes the
infinite limit.
(v): On the other hand, one can often see emergent behaviour on the way to the limit.
Indeed, the larger your error bar, e.g. for detecting experimental statistics characteristic
of some commuting operators, the lower the number of particles (or lattice sites) N for
which your experiments will confirm (more precisely: you think your experiments con-
firm!) the properties and behaviour that are characteristic of superselection.
(vi): Various supervenience theses hold—but they are trivial, or at least scientifically
useless.
7 Phase transitions
Lack of space means I must deal much more briefly with my fourth example. This is un-
fortunate, for two reasons. Scientifically, this example represents a much larger and more
controversial topic than my previous ones. And philosophically, it has been a prominent
example in recent controversy about whether the N = ∞ limit is “physical real”, and
whether a “singular” limit is necessary for emergence (e.g. Callender (2001, Section 5,
pp. 547-551), Liu (2001, Sections 2-3, pp. S326-S341), Batterman (2005, Section 4, pp.
233-237); and more recently, Mainwood (2006, Chapters 3,4; 2006a), Bangu (2009, Sec-
tion 5, pp. 496-502), Menon and Callender (2011, especially Sections 3, 4)). But sufficient
unto the day is the work thereof! I have already declared my general position in these
controversies (especially in Sections 1 and 3). So in this Section, it will be enough to
sketch: (i) how statistical mechanics treats phase transitions by taking a limit, in which
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the number of constituent particles (or sites in a lattice) N goes to infinity (Section 7.1);
and (ii) how this treatment illustrates my claims (Section 7.2).
For more information, I especially recommend: (i) accounts by masters of the subject,
such as Emch and Liu (2002, Chapters 11-14) and Kadanoff (2009, 2010, 2010a), which
treat the technicalities and history, as well as the conceptual foundations, of the subject;
and (ii) Mainwood (2006, Chapters 3,4; 2006a), to which I am much indebted, especially
in Section 7.2.1’s treatment of phase transitions in finite N systems, and Section 7.2.2’s
discussion of cross-over.
7.1 Phase transitions and thermodynamics
7.1.1 Separating issues and limiting scope
This example is an aspect of a very large topic, the “emergence” of thermodynamics from
statistical mechanics—around which debates about the reducibility of one to the other
continue. This topic is very large, for various reasons. Three obvious ones are: (i) both
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics are entire sciences; (ii) statistical mechanics,
and so this topic, can be developed in either classical or quantum terms; (iii) there is no
single agreed formalism for statistical mechanics (unlike e.g. quantum mechanics).
Phase transitions are themselves a large topic: there are several classification schemes
for them, and various approaches to understanding them—some of which come in both
classical and quantum versions. I will specialize to just one aspect; which will however
be enough to illustrate my claims. Namely: the fact (on most approaches!) that for
statistical mechanical systems, getting a (theoretical description of) a phase transition
requires that one take a limit (often called ‘the thermodynamic limit’), in which the
number of constituent particles (or sites in a lattice) N goes to infinity. In brief, this
means something like: both the number N of constituent particles (or sites), and the
volume V of the system tend to infinity, while the density ρ = N/V remains fixed. More
details in Section 7.1.2.
Even for this one aspect, I will have to restrict myself severely. Three main limitations
are:
1): As regards philosophy, I impose a self-denying ordinance about the controversies
mentioned in this Section’s preamble: apart from what I have already said in Sections 1
and 3—and one remark in Section 7.2.1!
2): In physics, how to understand phase transitions is an ongoing research area. For
our purposes, the main limiting (i.e. embarrassing!) fact is that most systems do not have
a well-defined thermodynamic limit—so that all that follows is of limited scope.
3): Various detailed justifications can be given for phase transitions requiring us to
take the thermodynamic limit; and Section 7.1.2 will only sketch a general argument, and
mention two examples. Much needs to be (and has been!) said by way of assessing these
justifications—but I will not enter into this here. But by way of emphasizing how open all
these issues are, I note that some physicists have developed frameworks for understanding
phase transitions without taking the thermodynamic limit (Gross (2001)).
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7.1.2 The thermodynamic limit
I will first give a broad description of the need for the thermodynamic limit; and then
a classical and a quantum example to show how the limit secures new mathematical
structure appropriate for describing phase transitions; (Section 7.1.2.A). Then in Section
7.1.2.B, I will give a classical example of approaching the limit. This example will be the
phase transition of a ferromagnet at sub-critical temperatures. It has the merit of being
very simple, and of developing Section 3.3.2’s dissolution of the “mystery” of describing
a finite-N system with a model using infinite N .
7.1.2.A: The need for the limit:— For classical physics, the brutal summary of why we
need this limit is as follows. Statistical mechanics follows thermodynamics in representing
phase transitions by non-analyticities of the free energy F . But a non-analyticity cannot
occur for the free energy of a system with finitely many constituent particles (or anal-
ogously: lattice sites). So statistical mechanics considers a system with infinitely many
particles or sites, N =∞. One gets some control over this idea by subjecting the limiting
process, N → ∞, to physically-motivated conditions like keeping the density constant,
i.e. letting the volume V of the system also go to infinity, while N/V is constant. As
we would expect—especially given my previous examples!—this infinite limit gives new
mathematical structures: which happily turn out to describe phase transitions—in many
cases, in remarkable quantitative detail.
But to make my ferromagnet example comprehensible, I need to spell out this line of
argument in a bit more detail. In Gibbsian statistical mechanics, we postulate that the
probability of a state s is proportional to exp(−H(s)/kT ) ≡ exp(−βH(s)), where β := 1
kT
is the inverse temperature and k is Boltzmann’s constant. That is:
prob(s) = exp(−βH(s))/Z (7.1)
where the normalization factor Z, the partition function, is the sum (or integral) over all
states, and defines the free energy F as:
Z = Σs exp(−βH(s)) =: exp(−βF ) . (7.2)
Thus F is essentially, the logarithm of the partition function; which is itself the sum
(or integral) over all states of the exponential of the Hamiltonian. It turns out that Z
and F encode, in their functional forms, a great deal of information about the system:
various quantities, in particular the system’s thermodynamic quantities, can be obtained
from them, especially by taking their derivatives. For example, in a ferromagnet, the
magnetization is the first derivative of the free energy with respect to the applied magnetic
field, and the magnetic susceptibility is the second derivative.
Now, broadly speaking: phase transitions involve abrupt changes, in time and-or space,
in thermodynamic quantities: for example, think of the change of particle density in a
solid-liquid, or liquid-gas, transition. Thermodynamics describes these changes as dis-
continuities in thermodynamic quantities (or their derivatives), and statistical mechanics
follows suit. This means that the statistical mechanical description of phase transitions
requires non-analyticities of the free energy F . But under widely applicable assumptions,
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the free energy of a system with finitely many constituent particles (or analogously: sites)
is an analytic function of the thermodynamic quantities within it. For example, we will
soon see that in the Ising model with N sites, the Hamiltonian H is a quadratic polyno-
mial in spin variables (cf. eq. 7.4). This means that the partition function Z, which by
eq. 7.2 is a sum of exponentials of −βH, is analytic; and so also is its logarithm, and the
free energy. (This and similar arguments about more general forms of the Hamiltonian (or
partition function or free energy), are widespread: e.g. Ruelle (1969, p. 108f.), Thompson
(1972, p. 79), Le Bellac (1991, p. 9), Lavis and Bell (1999, pp. 72-3)) .
I of course admit that—as my phrases ‘broadly speaking’ and ‘under widely applicable
assumptions’ indicate—this argument why phase transitions need the thermodynamic
limit is not a rigorous theorem. Hence the effort mentioned in Section 7.1.1 to develop a
theory of phase transitions in finite systems; and the philosophical debate among Callender
et al. mentioned in this Section’s preamble. Hence also the historical struggle to recognize
the need for infinite systems: both Emch and Liu (2002, p. 394) and Kadanoff (2009, p.
782; 2010, Section 4.4) cite the famous incident of Kramers putting the matter to a vote
at a meeting in memory of Van der Waals in 1937.25
But this argument, although not a rigorous theorem, is very “robust”—and recognized
as such by the literature. For example, Kadanoff makes it one of the main themes of his
recent discussions, and even dubs it the ‘extended singularity theorem’ (2010, Sections 2.2,
6.7.1; 2010a, Section 4.1). He also makes it a playful variation on Anderson’s slogan that
‘more is different’ (as I mentioned in footnote 1). Namely, he summarizes it in Section
titles like ‘more is the same; infinitely more is different’ (2009, Section 1.5; 2010, Section
3). In any case, for the rest of this paper, I accept the argument.
Taking the thermodynamic limit introduces new mathematical structures. But (as
one might expect from my previous examples) the variety of formalisms in statistical
mechanics (and indeed, the variety of justifications for taking the limit) means that there
is a concomitant variety of new structures that in the limit get revealed. I mention one
classical, and one quantum, example.
In Yang-Lee theory (initiated by Yang and Lee 1952), one uses complex generalizations
of the partition function and free energy, and then argues that for any z ∈ |C, there can
be a phase transition (i.e. a non-analyticity of F or Z) at z only if there are zeroes of
Z arbitrarily close to z. For finite N , Z has finitely many zeroes, so that there can be a
phase transition only at the zeroes themselves: but all of them lie off the real line, and
so are not physical. Taking the limit N → ∞ “breaks” this last argument: there can be
a curve of zeroes that intersects the real axis. Indeed, in Yang-Lee theory one goes on
to classify phase transitions in terms of the behaviour of the density of zeroes in |C: (cf.
25Of course, since I have not precisely defined ‘thermodynamic limit’—let alone ‘phase transition’ !—the
argument could hardly be a rigorous theorem. Ruelle (1969, Sections 2.3-4, 3.3-5) rigorously discusses
conditions for the thermodynamic limit; (cf. also Emch (1972, p. 299; 2006, p. 1159) Lavis and Bell
(1999a, pp. 116, 260)). Such discussions bring out how in some models, the limit is not just the idea
that, keeping the density constant, the number N of molecules or sites tends to infinity: there are also
conditions on the limiting behaviour of short-range forces. This means that the models eventually run
up against both aspects of my fourth claim, (4:Unreal), i.e. against what Section 2 called ‘atomism’ and
‘cosmology’.
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Thompson 1972, pp. 85-88; Ruelle 1969, pp. 108-112; Lavis and Bell 1999a, pp. 114,
125-134).
My quantum example concerns Gibbs states and KMS states. This follows on from
Section 6’s discussion of superselection: especially Section 6.2.1 on unitarily inequivalent
representations of an algebra of quantities, and these representations differing in the value
of a global/macroscopic quantity. (For more details, cf. Emch (1972, pp. 213-223; 2006,
Section 5.6-7, pp. 1144-1154); Sewell (1986, pp. 73-80; 2002, pp. 113-123); Emch and
Liu (2002, pp. 346-357), Liu and Emch (2005, pp. 142-145, 157-161).)
Thus we recall that the Gibbs state of a finite quantum system with Hamiltonian H
at inverse temperature β = 1
kT
is given by the density matrix
ρ = exp(−βH)/tr(exp(−βH)) (7.3)
and represents the (Gibbsian) equilibrium state of the system. (Note the beautiful analogy
with eq.s 7.1 and 7.2!) It is unique (for given β): thereby precluding the representation
of two phases of the system at a common temperature—as one would want for a phase
transition.26
So how can we give a quantum description of phase transitions? The algebraic ap-
proach to quantum statistical mechanics proposes some states, viz. KMS states, which
are defined on infinite quantum systems and which generalize the notion of a Gibbs state
in a way that is (a) compelling mathematically, and (b) well-suited to describing phase
transitions. A word about each of (a) and (b):—
(a): A mathematical property of Gibbs states (the ‘KMS condition’) is made into a
definition of an equilibrium state that is applicable to both infinite and finite systems:
(for the latter it coincides with the Gibbs state at the given temperature). KMS states
can be shown to have various stability or robustness properties that makes them very well
suited to describe (stable) physical equilibria. (Emch (2006, Section 5.4, pp. 1128-1142)
is a excellent survey of these properties. Such a survey brings out how KMS states could
themselves form an example of emergent behaviour, in my sense of novel and robust prop-
erties!)
(b): The set Kβ of KMS states at a given inverse temperature β is in general not a
singleton set. Rather, it is convex, with: (i) every element having a unique expression as
a mixture of its extremal points; and (ii) its extremal points being well-suited to describe
pure thermodynamical phases (mathematically, they are factor states). Taken together,
(i) and (ii) suggest that a compelling representative of the state of a system undergoing
a phase transition at inverse temperature β is a non-extremal ω ∈ Kβ.
So much by way of indicating justifications for taking “the” thermodynamic limit. I
turn to discussing the approach to the limit.
7.1.2.B: Approaching the limit:— I will give a classical example of approaching the
26This uniqueness also precludes spontaneous symmetry breaking, understood (as usual) as the al-
lowance of distinct equilibria that differ by a dynamical symmetry—e.g. in Section 6.2.1’s scenario,
ground states each with all spins aligned, but in different spatial directions. Spontaneous symmetry
breaking is (yet another!) important aspect of phase transitions which I cannot here pursue: a fine recent
philosophical discussion is Liu and Emch (2005).
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limit N → ∞ of infinitely many sites in a lattice: namely, the phase transition (change
of magnetization) of a ferromagnet at sub-critical temperatures, as described by the Ising
model with N sites (in two or more spatial dimensions). As I mentioned at the start of
this Section, this will develop Section 3.3.2’s dissolving of the “mystery” of describing a
finite-N system with a model using infinite N .
The Ising model postulates that at each of N sites, a classical “spin” variable σ (which
we think of as defined with respect to some spatial direction) takes the values ±1. To
do Gibbsian statistical mechanics, i.e. to apply eq.s 7.1 and 7.2, we need to define a
Hamiltonian and then sum over configurations. The Hamiltonian is chosen to give a
simple representation of the ideas that (i) neighbouring spins interact and tend to be
aligned (i.e. their having equal values has lower energy) and (ii) the spins are coupled
to an external magnetic field which points along the given spatial direction. Thus the
Hamiltonian is
H = J Σnnσpσq + J
′ Σσp . (7.4)
where: the first sum is over all pairs of nearest-neighbour sites, the second sum is over all
sites, J (with the dimension energy) is negative to represent that the neighbouring spins
“like” to be aligned, and J ′ is given by the magnetic moment times the external magnetic
field.
The simplest possible case is the case of N = 1! With only one site, the Hamiltonian
becomes
H = J ′σ ; (7.5)
so that if we define a dimensionless coupling h := −J ′/kT , then eq.s 7.1 and 7.2 give
prob(+1) = eh/z and prob(−1) = e−h/z , with z = eh + e−h = 2 coshh . (7.6)
This implies that the magnetization, i.e. the average value of the spin, is
〈σ〉 = eh/z − e−h/z = tanhh . (7.7)
This is as we would hope: the statistical mechanical treatment of a single spin predicts
the magnetization increases smoothly from -1, through zero, to +1 as the applied field
along the given axis increases from minus infinity through zero to plus infinity.
What about larger N? The analytical problem becomes much more complicated
(though the magnetization is still a smooth function of the applied field). But the ef-
fect is what we would expect: a larger N acts as a brake on the ferromagnet’s response
to the applied field increasing from negative to positive values (along the given axis).
That is: the increased number of nearest neighbours means that the ferromagnet “lingers
longer”, has “more inertia”, before the rising value of the applied field succeeds in flipping
the magnetization from -1 to +1. More precisely: as N increases, most of the change in
the magnetization occurs more and more steeply, i.e. occurs in a smaller and smaller
interval around the applied field being zero. Thus the magnetic susceptibility, defined as
the derivative of magnetization with respect to magnetic field, is, in the neighbourhood of
0, larger for larger N , and tends to infinity as N →∞. As Kadanoff says: ‘at a very large
number of sites ... the transition will become so steep that the causal observer might say
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that it has occurred suddenly. The astute observer will look more closely, see that there
is a very steep rise, and perhaps conclude that the discontinuous jump occurs only in the
infinite system’ (2009, p. 783; and Figure 4; cf. also 2010, p. 20, Figure 5).
Clearly, this example corresponds closely to that in Section 3.3.2’s dissolving of the
“mystery”. And this general picture of the approach to the N →∞ limits applies much
more widely. In particular, very similar remarks apply to liquid-gas phase transition, i.e.
boiling. There the quantity which becomes infinite in the N →∞ limit, i.e. the analogue
of the magnetic susceptibility, is the compressibility, defined as the derivative of the density
with respect to the pressure. And I am happy to give a hostage to fortune: as I declared
in Section 3.3.2’s footnote 9, I believe this example is a good prototype for dissolving the
corresponding alleged mystery in physics’ other ‘singular’ limits. Though I cannot argue
for that here, I note that the views of some philosophers discussing phase transitions seem
to mesh with it: e.g. Mainwood’s proposal in Section 7.2.1 below; Bangu’s appeal (2009,
p. 497f.) to Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) distinction between data and phenomena;
and Menon and Callender (2011, Sections 3, 4).
7.2 The claims illustrated by emergent phase transitions
I will not now devote a Subsection to each of my three main claims, (1:Deduce), (2:Before)
and (3:Herring), as I did for my first three examples. It would take too much space—and
much more detail that Section 7.1 has supplied—to do so. Thus (1:Deduce) would require
me to properly define: (a) a handful of novel and robust behaviours shown in phase transi-
tions (a handful of Tts), and (b) a corresponding handful of statistical mechanical theories
Tb in which the behaviours are rigorously deducible if one takes an appropriate version
of “the” thermodynamic limit, N →∞—but not otherwise. Similarly, for (2:Before) and
(3:Herring). Doing all that properly would require a Section as long as Section 6 ... and
as to (3:Herring), I would anyway prefer not to flog horses that by now should be dead!
Instead, I will just summarize how phase transitions illustrate the three claims, and
endorse a proposal of Mainwood’s about emergence before the limit: i.e. about how
to think of phase transitions in finite-N systems (Section 7.2.1). Then I will briefly
report a remarkable class of phenomena associated with phase transitions, viz. cross-
over phenomena; (Section 7.2.2). These phenomena make emergence before the limit
even more vivid than it was in my previous examples; for they show how an emergent
phenomenon can be first gained, then lost, as we approach a phase transition. And this
will illustrate (4:Unreal) as well as (2:Before). (For (ii), as for (i), I learnt what follows
from Paul Mainwood (2006, especially Chapters 3 and 4). So all this Subsection owes a
great deal to him.)
7.2.1 Emergence in the limit, and before it: Mainwood’s proposal
My main claims are my two reconciling claims, (1:Deduce) and (2:Before). Applied to
phase transitions, they would say, roughly speaking:
(1:Deduce): Some of the emergent behaviours shown in phase transitions are, when
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understood (as in thermodynamics) in terms of non-analyticities, rigorously deducible
within a statistical mechanical theory that takes an appropriate version of the N → ∞
limit. But they are not deducible in a theory that sticks to finite N ; so that if one
concentrates on finite N , one will claim irreducibility.
(2:Before): But these behaviours can also be understood more weakly; (no doubt, this
is in part a matter of understanding them phenomenologically). And thus understood,
they occur before the limit, i.e. in finite-N systems.
Here I admit that the phrases ‘some of the emergent’, ‘appropriate version’ and ‘can
be understood more weakly’ are vague in ways which, as I said in the preamble, I have
not the space to make precise: hence my saying ‘roughly speaking’. But I still submit
that the claims are true, for a wide class of emergent behaviours; and that Section 7.1.2
gives good evidence for this. More precisely, Section 7.1.2.A supports (1:Deduce), and
Section 7.1.2.B supports (2:Before).27 By way of summing up: one can check that the six
previous morals, (i) to (vi), that were used in Sections 5.4 and 6.4 to sum up the fractals
and superselection examples, apply again.
Finally, I would like to briefly report and endorse a proposal of Mainwood’s (2006,
Section 4.4.1, p. 238; 2006a, Section 4.1) which fits well with the swings-and-roundabouts
flavour of my combining (1:Deduce), especially its negative claim of non-deducibility at
finite N , with (2:Before). Mainwood’s topic is, not emergence in general, but the recent
philosophical debate about phase transitions in finite systems, especially as focussed by
Callender’s (2001, p. 549) presentation of four jointly contradictory propositions about
phase transitions. Mainwood first gives a very judicious survey of the pros and cons
of denying each of the four propositions, and then uses its conclusions to argue for a
proposal that evidently reconciles: (a) statistical mechanics’ use of the thermodynamic
limit to describe phase transitions in terms of non-analyticities; and (b) our saying that
phase transitions occur in the finite system. That is, to take a stock example: Mainwood’s
proposal secures that a kettle of water, though a finite system, can boil!
Mainwood’s proposal is attractively simple. It is that for a system with N degrees of
freedom, with a free energy FN that has a well-defined thermodynamic limit, FN → F∞,
we should just say:
phase transitions occur in the finite system iff F∞ has non-analyticities.
And if we wish, we can add requirements that avoid our having to say that small systems
(e.g. a lattice of four Ising spins laid out in a square) undergo phase transitions. Namely:
we can add to the above right-hand side conditions along the following lines: and if N is
large enough, or the gradient of FN is steep enough etc. (Of course, ‘large enough’ etc.
are vague words. But Mainwood thinks that the consequent vagueness about whether a
phase transition occurs is acceptable; and I agree—after all, ‘boil’ etc. are vague.)
27Besides, a theory of phase transitions in finite systems of the kind argued for by Gross (mentioned in
Section 7.1.1) would surely illustrate (2:Before), rather than refute (1:Deduce)’s negative claim of non-
deducibility at finite N . For of course, a theory like Gross’ cannot overturn pure mathematical arguments,
for example about the analyticity of certain forms of partition function.
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7.2.2 Cross-over: gaining and losing emergence at finite N
I end by describing cross-over phenomena. I again follow Mainwood, who uses it (2006,
Sections 4.4.2-3, pp. 242-247; 2006a, Section 4.2) to illustrate and defend his proposal
for phase transitions in finite systems. I concur with that use of it. But my own aims
are rather different. The main idea (mentioned at the start of Section 2 and the end of
Section 5.3) will be that cross-over phenomena yield striking illustrations of “oscillations”
between (2:Before) and (4:Unreal). That is: a system can be:
(i) first, manipulated so as to illustrate (2:Before), i.e. an emergent behaviour at finite
N ; and
(ii) then manipulated so as to lose this behaviour, i.e. to illustrate (4:Unreal); by the
manipulation corresponding to higher, and unrealistic, values of N ; and
(iii) then manipulated so as to either (a) enter a regime illustrating some other emer-
gent behaviour, or (b) revert to the first emergent behaviour; so that either (a) or (b)
illustrate (2:Before) again.
In short: cross-over will illustrate my swings-and-roundabouts combination of (2:Before)
and (4:Unreal).
Besides, cross-over will illustrate a simpler point about (2:Before), which we already
saw for my first two examples: viz., how the emergent behaviour that one “sees” at large
but finite N , can be “lost” if one alters certain features of the situation. We saw this:
(a) for the method of arbitrary functions: by raising one’s standard of how close to
exact equiprobability was “close enough”, or by widening the class of density functions
with respect to each of which one required approximate equiprobability; (Sections 4.2.1,
4.2.2) and
(b) for fractals: by “getting better eyesight”, i.e. by reducing the length-scale on which
one could resolve spatial structure—and so see that at the given finite N , there was not
yet the infinitely descending tower of structure characteristic of a fractal; (Section 5.2.2).
Cross-over occurs near a critical phase transition. This is one where a quantity called
the correlation length ξ, which summarizes the average length-scale on which microscopic
quantities’ values are correlated, diverges (in the modest sense of growing without bound,
reviewed in Section 3.1). Understanding many such transitions (quantitatively as well as
qualitatively), and understanding cross-over in particular, is one of the great successes of
the renormalization group (RG) techniques that have been developed over the last fifty
years.
Beware: some recent philosophical literature, waxing enthusiastic about the RG, sug-
gests that every phase transition has a “singular” thermodynamic limit and-or infinite
correlation length. Not so: witness the fact that until now, this Section has not had to
mention the RG! More generally, I reiterate my point (e.g. in the preamble to Section 3
and in Section 6.2.2) that there can be emergent limiting behaviour, with nothing “singu-
lar” about the limit. But enough admonition! I turn to describing cross-over; (for details,
cf. e.g. Yeomans (1992, p. 112), Cardy (1997, pp. 61, 69-72), Chaikin and Lubensky
(2000, pp. 216, 270-3); Hadzibabic et al. (2006) is a recent example of experiments).
As substances approach a critical phase transition, they typically show behaviour char-
68
acteristic of one of a small number of universality classes. Cross-over happens when a
substance appears to show behaviour characteristic of one universality class, but then
suddenly changes to another as it is brought even closer to its critical point. To explain
this, we first recall the basic idea of the RG, as follows.
(1): We define a space X coordinatized by the parameter values that define the mi-
croscopic Hamiltonian, e.g. interaction strengths between particles, and the strength of
the coupling to an external field; (and typically, also temperature).
(2): We define a transformation T on X designed to preserve the large-scale physics
of the system. Typically, T is a coarse-graining, defined by local collective variables that
take some sort of majority vote about the local quantities’ values, followed by a rescaling,
so that the resulting system can be assigned to a point in X.28
(3): This assignment of the resulting system to a point within X enables one to con-
sider iterating T , so that we get a flow on X. Critical points where ξ diverges will be
among the fixed points of this flow. For the fact that ξ diverges means that the system
“looks the same” at all length-scales, so that T fixes (makes no change in) the description
of the system. (Besides, this scale-invariance can involve power-law behaviour on all scales
and self-similarity, and so lead to the use of fractals, e.g. to describe the distribution of
sizes of the “islands” of aligned spins in a two- or three-dimensional Ising model; cf. the
end of Section 5.3)
I can now describe cross-over. I choose a kind called finite-size cross-over. This occurs
when the ratio of ξ to the system’s size determines the fixed point towards which the
RG flow sends the system. When ξ is small compared to the size of the system, though
very large on a microscopic length-scale, the system flows towards a certain fixed point
representing a phase transition; and so exemplifies a certain universality class. Or to put it
more prosaically: coarser and coarser (and suitably rescaled) descriptions of the system are
more and more like descriptions of a phase transition. So in the jargon of my claims: the
system illustrates (2:Before). But as ξ grows even larger, and becomes comparable with
the system size, the flow crosses over and moves away—in general, eventually, towards a
different fixed point. In my jargon: the system runs up against (4:Unreal), and goes over
to another universality class—eventually to another behaviour illustrating (2:Before).
Of course, the correlation length will only approach a system’s physical size when the
system has been brought very close indeed to the phase transition, well within the usual
experimental error. That is: until we enter the cross-over regime, experimental data about
quantities such as the gradient of the free energy will strongly suggest non-analyticities,
such as a sharp corner or an infinite peak. Or in other words: until we enter this regime,
the behaviour will be as if the system is infinite in extent. But once we enter this regime,
and the cross-over occurs, the appearance of non-analyticities goes away: peaks become
tall and narrow—but finitely high. Again, in my jargon, we have: (2:Before) followed by
(4:Unreal).
Finally, I remark that a similar discussion would apply to other kinds of cross-over,
such as dimensional cross-over. For example, this occurs when the behaviour of a thin
28Hence another playful variation by Kadanoff on Anderson’s slogan (cf. footnote 1); Section 6.4 of
Kadanoff (2010) is called ‘Less is the same’.
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film crosses over from a universality class typical of three-dimensional systems to one for
two-dimensional systems, as ξ becomes comparable with the film’s thickness.
7.3 Envoi
I believe that my claims, in particular my two main ones, (1:Deduce) and (2:Before), are
illustrated by many examples beyond the four I have chosen. For instance, to stick to
the area of my main physics example, viz. the N → ∞ limit of quantum theory: there
are Sewell’s own examples of his scheme in Section 6.1.1, and KMS states’ description
of thermodynamic phases (Section 7.1.2.A). Showing my claims in many such examples
would indeed be strong testimony to the reconciliation of emergence and reduction. Work
for another day!
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